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Abstract
One of the most important claims of the neoliberal policy prescriptions for Central
and East European states in the early 199os was that 'communist' property should be
'privatised'. I contend that this policy prescription was based on a number of false
assumptions about what 'communist' property was and about communist law. As a
result, the post-communist process of privatisation was plagued by many unintended
and negative effects. The consequence was the great enrichment of the former com-
munist managers who were able to benefit from 'privatisation' at the expense of the
public, in a process which was not 'rights based' or 'democratic. I argue that the reality
of 'communist property' was totally different from that assumed by neoliberal agents
and policies. The distinctiveness of communist property arrangements resided not in
the absence of private property, which was tolerated under communism, but in the
organisation of property as an administrative matter.
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1 Introduction
A quarter of a century after the transformation of communist property into
private property, we can ascertain that this great transformation was undoubt-
edly one of the most important changes that occurred after the implosion of
the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 1989. Mainly
realised by a mechanism which could be conceived of as a legal instrument,
privatisation, this remarkable transformation was a reversal of the 'transfer' of
private property into the hands of the state that occurred through all the coun-
tries of the region prior to and after the Second World War.' However, this ini-
tial transfer was operated principally by fascist or communist governments in
the shadow or in the outright breach of the law of that time.2 By contrast, the
post-communist transformation of property was based on 'rule of law' ambi-
tions and on privatisation.
From a transitional justice perspective, the priority given by the post-
communist CEE governments to measures transforming state property into
private property is not easily comprehensible, taking into consideration
the communist era record of wrongs, and especially those associated with the
communist takeover in the late 1940s. Transitional justice programmes would
involve the adoption in CEE of strong retributive-compensatory measures and
not measures distributional in character such as privatisation.
Nevertheless, this priority given by the post-communist CEE governments
to privatisation becomes understandable if one takes into consideration the
internal and external influences on the process of elaboration of transitional
policies in post-communist CEE. Thus, in the early 199os, the neoliberal para-
digm formed the basis on which the Western governments and the interna-
tional financial organisations approached the post-communist transitions and
supported legal reform programs.3 This paradigm equalised the transfer of
1 See generally Istvin PogAny, Righting Wrongs in Eastern Europe (Manchester University Press,
1997); Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (University of
Washington Press, 1974); Samuel Herman, 'War Damage and Nationalization in Eastern
Europe', Law and Contemporary Problems 16(3) (1951) 498.
2 The nationalisation of private property after wwi was not necessarily operated by commu-
nist governments or by governments dominated by communists. The case of Czechoslovakia,
where property already nationalised or confiscated by Nazis was transferred to the state by
the non-communist Benes Government, in the aftermath of wwn, is paradigmatic for the
region. See e.g. Tony Judt, Postwar:A History ofEurope since 1945 (London: Pimlico, 2007).
3 The best-known definition of 'neoliberalism' is that developed by David Harvey. Accordingly
to Harvey, neoliberalism is 'A theory of political economic practices that proposes that
human wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms
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state property into private property with the rule of law and with economic
development.4 This international influence met in the early 1990s an internal
one. During that time, the CE E economists who were instrumental in elaborat-
ing the post-communist CEE economic reforms held the idea that communism
could not be reformed. They thought that the severance of the links between
the socialist state and the socialist enterprise by privatisation of the latter
would 'naturally' lead to the disappearance of the communist power base
and consequently the communist regime.5 The meeting of these internal and
external neoliberal currents led to the adoption of measures to transform state
property into private property, mainly by privatisation, at the expense of
retributive and compensatory measures. Thus, while the great transformation
of the communist states' property into private property makes less sense from
a transitional justice perspective, it represents the accomplishment of the neo-
liberal agenda and policy prescriptions of the early 1990s.
However, as I will show in this article, the adoption in haste by the political
post-communist elites of neoliberal policy recommendations led to a host of
unintended consequences. Moreover, the neoliberal prescriptions for privati-
sation were based on several classical economic and juristic assumptions
which do not hold at a closer examination. Important among these assump-
tions was the idea that the transformation of communist property into private
property implied the creation of a 'bundle of rights, clearly delimited and
divisible between private holders. Nevertheless, this was not the only false
assumption adopted by the post-communist politicians. As I will argue, the
particularities of the communist arrangements of property went far beyond
and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights,
free market, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional
framework appropriate to such practices.' David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalsm
(Oxford University Press, 2007).
4 See generally David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic
Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge University Press, zoo6); Ruth E. Gordon and
Jon H. Sylvester, 'Deconstructing Development, Wisconsin International Lawjournal Z2(1)
(2004)1.
5 See e.g. Johanna Bockman and Gil Eyal, 'Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Economic
Knowledge: The Transnational Roots of Neoliberalism', American journal of Sociology 108(2)
(2002) 310 at 338; Frank Banker, Klaus Muller and Andreas Pickel, 'Cross-disciplinary
Approaches to Postcommunist Transformation: Context and Agenda, in: Frank Banker, Klaus
Miller and Andreas Pickel (eds), Postcommunist Transformation and the Social Sciences:
Cross-disciplinary Approaches (New York and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002) l at 6; John
A. Gould, 'Out of the Blue? Democracy and Privatisation in Postcommunist Europe,
Comparative European Politics 1(3) (2003) 277 at 277.
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anything that the simplistic economic and juridical descriptions of property
adopted at the onset of the post-communist 'transition' would have permitted
the observer to recognise. In fact, the particularities of the communist arrange-
ments of property were so great in relation to those assumed by the post-com-
munist governments when adopting policies of property transfer that almost
all these policies appear on closer scrutiny to be flawed. Thus, it was not only
that the private property did not disappear under 'real existing socialism', so it
did not have to be recreated miraculously at the onset of post-communist
'transitions'. More importantly, the 'privatisation' of the communist state prop-
erty implied an administrative capacity of the post-communist states and a
degree of scrutiny - in order to make this privatisation 'just' - that would sim-
ply not have been available. The legal concepts and the simplistic assumptions
used in post-communist privatisation laws appear in these circumstances to
be mere window dressing. They are evidence of a desire to get rid of state prop-
erty at almost any cost. That, in such circumstances, the post-communist elites
entrusted with the administration of the 'give-away' of state property should
have profited so handsomely should not be regarded as surprising. It is also
unsurprising that, at the lower levels of post-communist societies, the transfor-
mations were widely perceived as unlawful and unjust.
To demonstrate the truth of these statements, I will provide first an analysis
of communist property, necessary for a basic understanding of the characteris-
tics of property in communist times. I will start with the seminal anthropologi-
cal description of communist property provided by Katherine Verdery. Next,
I will provide an analysis of the problems posed by the communist organisa-
tion of property in terms of the post-1989 transformations of such property.
As will be shown using comparative law research, there was a degree of
comparability between the communist CEE legal orders and the continental
Franco-German traditions on which the legal systems of these countries were
based, notwithstanding the post-1989 ideological assumptions that 'socialist
law' and legal order were totally different from those found in the West. This
comparability was accentuated before the fall of the communist system, espe-
cially in countries such as Poland and Hungary that experimented with the
'market' system in the 1980s. Moreover, private property during the communist
era had not been as exceptional as the post-1989 policies aiming at transform-
ing socialist property may suggest. For example, home ownership in the CEE
socialist countries had been well above Western European levels.6 Therefore, a
6 See e.g. Kiril Stanilov, 'Housing Trends in Central and Eastern European Cities during and
after the Period of Transition', in Kiril Stanilov, The Post-Socialist City Urban Form and Space
Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe after Socialism (Springer, 2007) 173; J6zsef
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significant proportion of those living in the CEE area had owned private prop-
erty during state socialism, even if private property had enjoyed a lower degree
of protection than state-owned property from the standpoint of communist
law. These important pockets of private property could not be 'restituted' or
transferred by privatisation to private actors after the fall of communism, since
they already existed in the form of private property under communism. Thus,
the bulk of the state property to be 'transferred' was property belonging to
socialist 'enterprises. In practice, much of this state-owned property was sub-
jected to privatisation and not to restitution. The unit of analysis in this section
will therefore be the 'socialist enterprise' and the focus of the analysis will be
on the particularities of the socialist enterprise in relation to Western corpo-
rate forms. As will be argued, what made this socialist enterprise so radically
distinct from Western corporate forms was not necessarily the 'socialist law'
which formed the basis of its existence. In many ways the socialist corporate
law was not different from Western corporate law and it operated with similar
legal concepts.7 'What made the socialist enterprise so distinct were the opera-
tional rules on the basis of which this socialist creature functioned. Yet, the
post-1989 legal reforms, aiming to 'privatise' this socialist enterprise, superfi-
cially addressed the law's pillar while leaving unchanged the operational rules.
Moreover, the capacity of the post-communist states to implement different
operational rules for socialist enterprises designated for privatisation and the
degree of scrutiny needed to change the communist operational codes were
simply lacking, if not specifically diminished following neo-liberal rhetoric.
Privatisation of socialist enterprises, in such circumstances, widely enriched
the post-communist elites entrusted with its application, while contributing
to the widespread perception of unlawfulness of this transformation amongst
the citizens of the post-communist states. For analytical reasons, this argu-
ment is provided in the next three sections of the article: one which deals with
the legal characterisation of property during communist times, one dealing
with the preservation of communist property organisational rules during the
process of privatisation post-1989, and one discussing the major shortcomings
Hegediis, Ivin Tosics and Stephen K. Mayo, 'Transition of the Housing Sector in Eastern
Central Europe, Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies 8(2) (1996) 1o;
G. Andruzs, M. Harloe and I. Szelenyi (eds), Cities after Socialism: Urban and Regional Change
and Conflict in Post-Socialist Societies (Studies in Urban and Social Change, Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, 1996)192.
7 See e.g. Inga Markovits, 'The Death of Socialist Law?, Annual Review of the Law and Social
Science 3 (2007) 233 at 236, showing the degree of similarity of formal Soviet law even under
Stalin to the Western law in matters related to property, contracts and corporations.
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of the neoliberal model of privatisation realised in post-communist Europe.
The article ends with a restatement of the findings.
2 Communist Property
In the 1980s any meaningful change in CEE was seen to depend on political
reform," which was difficult to achieve, if not impossible, in most countries of
the region.9 The sudden collapse of communism in CE E in 1989 resolved almost
overnight the intractable political problem of the 1980s, but it brought to the
fore the problem of the economic transformation of Eastern Europe.10
It was in this new context of economic transformation that'Western neoclas-
sical economics in its i98os neoliberal variant came to be widely regarded
as the fountain of theoretical knowledge and of practical wisdom' by the
post-communist governments in CEE. Arguably, the post-communist CEE
governments formulating agendas of economic changes looked for such inspi-
ration because this neoliberal variant 'claimed to combine the most advanced
theories and methods of social sciences with superior Western values in
formulating clear and unambiguous policy recommendations.' 12
However, this 'Western neoclassical economics in its 1980s neoliberal vari-
ant' did not provide any particularly meaningful description or understanding
of communist arrangements of property. In addition, it did not provide many
justifications for changes of the regime of property on the scale contem-
plated in post-communist CEE. It preferred, instead, to import the 'thin' classi-
cal liberal arguments about the moral superiority of individual property over
the communist property arrangements.13 It also preferred to advance some
8 See e.g. Andreas Pickel, 'Official Ideology? The Role of Neoliberal Economic Reform
Doctrines in Post-Communist Transformations, Polish Sociological Review, 4(U12) (1995)
361 at 362.
9 Romania, Czechoslovakia and the former GDR are countries of the region where the com-
munist elites rejected Gorbachev-style political reforms.
10 Pickel, 'Official Ideology?' (n 8) 362.
11 Ibid. See also Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (n 3), and especially Johanna
Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-wing Origins of Neoliberalsm
(Stanford University Press, 2011).
12 Bonker, Miler and Pickel, Postcommunist Transformation and the Social Sciences (n 5) 3.
13 See e.g. Joseph Persky, 'On the Thinness of the Utilitarian Defense of Private Property',
Journal of the History of Economic Thought 32(1) (2010) 63. See also Lawrence C. Becker,
'Review: Too Much Property, Philosophy and Public Affairs 21(2) (1992) 196, for a
critical review of the arguments brought in favour of private property by Waldron and
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important policy objectives, such as those related to the marketisation of the
(former) socialist economies, or those related to the privatisation of socialist
property in CEE. 14 Nevertheless, as it was observed by the World Bank econo-
mists, 'there was neither great theoretical justification nor hard evidence at the
beginning of the ig8os that the performance problems of state enterprise could
be altered by change in ownership. Thus, the CEE privatisation done before
1992-1993 took place in the absence of empirical support.'15
Irrespective of the analytical or justificatory weaknesses of neoliberalism
underlined above, the neoliberals were immensely successful in promoting
marketisation and privatisation of socialist property. This success of the neo-
liberal orthodoxy was due in no small part to its ideological ability to reduce
the 'problem of economic transformation to a narrow technical problem."
Since a technical solution could be usually provided for a technical
problem, the neoliberals suggested that the technical problem consisted in the
replacement of the old and irrational socialist system with a new and rational
system. And that this new system, 'the essential market system, required
merely the establishment of'a set of well-known and well-tried institutions.'17
Once such institutions had been established, everything else would 'automati-
cally fall in place.' 8 Thus, the post-communist CEE countries' move to markets
implied, in the neoliberal view, the adoption of a 'relatively closed list of laws
and institutions.'1 Legal reform meant for neoliberals the adoption of a num-
ber of rules and 'good laws' that furthered development in a globally integrated
economy, and the harmonisation of national legal regimes so that they became
compatible with dominant norms and institutions. 20 Such rules and good laws
Munzer, following the classic liberal cannon, and especially Alan Carter, The Philosophical
Foundations of Property Rights (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), for a critique of all philo-
sophical arguments brought in liberal thought in support of private property, including
those of Demsetz.
14 See e.g. World Bank, World Bank Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Anders Aslund, How Capitalism Was Built: The
Transformations of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia (Cambridge
University Press, 2007) 1 at 6.
15 Sunita Kikeri and John Nellis, 'An Assessment of Privatization, The World Bank Research
Observer 19(1) (2004) 87 at 92.
16 Pickel, 'Official Ideology?' (n 8) 368.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. 369.
19 Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Law, Distribution and Gender in Market
Reform (The Hague, London and New York: Kluwer Law International, 2002)131.
20 Ibid
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were for neoliberals 'neutral' in their effects, supplied 'a depoliticised
framework for economic activity, and were able 'to provide a neutral and just
context in which all can presumptively expect to thrive, as long as they make
the requisite effort.'21 Moreover, they were 'universal in their applicability
rather than specific to particular cultures, times or places', and they were
'uncontroversial as to the interest and values they promote.'22 In other words,
the neoliberal privatisation programme was advocated as 'a fundamentally
apolitical exercise' which represented the 'best route to the pursuit of greater
human freedom and welfare.'23
It is little surprising that, given the above vague and rather naive neoliberal
assumptions of the early 199os, the privatisation and marketisation of the post-
communist CEE economies were protracted and arduous processes. It is also
unsurprising that all the economic utility arguments brought forward tojustify
large-scale privatisation in post-communist CEE (and later in the former Uss R)
were invalidated by subsequent economic developments in the region,24 or
that, as late as 2002 and contrary to neoliberal assertions, only five CEE coun-
tries had exceeded their 1989 GDP levelS.25 Moreover, in contrast to this eco-
nomic collapse of CEE and the former USSR in the early 19o9s, China (and
Vietnam), which did not officially repudiate socialism and did not apply large-
scale privatisation programmes similar to those applied in CEE and the former
USSR during that period, experienced impressive rates of economic growth.26
Given these failures of the neoliberal policies, in relation to neoliberals' own
predictions and benchmarks, a question may arise: what makes the neoliberal
21 Ibid
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 For example, all the economies of the post-communist CEE countries took a sharp down-
turn in the years immediately after 1989, and several of these economies stabilised only
towards the end of the first decade of transformation. See e.g. Ivan T. Berend, From the
Soviet Bloc to the European Union: The Economic and Social Transformation of Central and
Eastern Europe since 1973 (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 6.
25 See e.g. David Lane,'Introduction: Two Outcomes of Transformationy in: David Lane (ed.),
The Transformation of State Socialism: System Change, Capitalism or Something Else?
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 9. If the former USSR is taken into consideration, most of
the post-communist countries were in 2002 characterised by lower levels of GDP than
at the beginning of the reform period. Ibid.
26 See e.g. Berend, From the Soviet Bloc to the European Union (n 24) 76, 171; Tsuneaki Sato,
'Convergence and Divergence in Transformation: Comparison of Experiences of CEECS
and China, in: Shinichi Ichimura, Tsuneaki Sato and William James (eds), Transition from
Socialist to Market Economies: Comparison of European and Asian Experiences (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009) 12-13.
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recommendations for privatisation in post-communist C EE so erroneous? The
brief answer to this question is that the neoliberals completely misunderstood
the realities of the communist property arrangements. Therefore, they wanted
to transform so feverishly into private property a 'communist property' that
they completely misunderstood.
In arguably one of the best anthropological descriptions of what made the
transformation of state property into private property so difficult after the fall
of communism in CEE, Katherine Verdery gives the following account of her
encounter with 'restitution' in a small village in Transylvania:
A North American urbanite might imagine (as I did myself) that this pro-
cess [of restitution] would unfold something as follows. Land was collec-
tivized by putting together all peasant farms in a village and working
them in common. Therefore because a field and its constituent parcels
are fixed goods - like a table with so many place mats on it, marking
where each piece begins and ends - to restore those parcels to their origi-
nal owners is only a matter of determining the coordinate of the place
mats prior to 1959 and reattributing them to whoever had them at the
time. This should not be a complicated matter. Whoever thinks this is
mistaken.27
In addition to these simplistic views of property, Verdery further identifies in
her text two of the sources of difficulties related to the politics of transforma-
tion of property relations via restitution: the political attempt to reconstruct
an earlier, idealised reality several decades later, and the political decision to
restitute a part of the former private property while keeping another part in
state property. She then concentrates on a third and major source of difficulty,
consisting in the application of a 'neoliberal' (restitution) law on a rural land-
scape, which was engendered by the 'socialist' transformation with 'elastic
qualities.'"
Verdery's above insights clearly allude to a more 'physicalist' conception of
things which, although matched conceptually in the case of land, was not nec-
essarily characteristic of all objects of property in socialism.29 Equally, her
27 Katherine Verdery, 'The Elasticity of Land: Problems of Property Restitution in
Transylvania, in: K. Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton
University Press, 1996) 133-134.
28 Verdery, 'The Elasticity of Land' (n 27)134-135.
29 For the physicalist conception of 'things' in Blackstone, and earlier 19th-century Ameri-
can legal thought and its development in the modem conception, which in my view
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insights were drawn from a particular Romanian restitution context which was
not necessarily applicable to the whole region.30
Irrespective of these limitations, Verdery's metaphor of the 'elastic qualities'
of socialist objects of property, nevertheless, captures a larger reality applica-
ble to the whole region. Moreover, even if every analytical scheme advanced
for the purpose of the description of property arrangements simplifies and
generalises, such schemes make, nonetheless, a conceptual analysis possible.
Compared with the simplistic schemes of property based on 'economic'
assumptions proposed at the onset of the post-communist 'transitions' by
neoliberals, Verdery's analysis is more sophisticated and arguably more apt
to capture the complex reality of property arrangements under socialism.
Furthermore, while the early study by Katherine Verdery cited above was
restricted to the Romanian context and was probably less ambitious in terms
of generalisation, her subsequent work on property transformations after the
fall of communism came to enrich the initial picture.31
Thus, in 2003, Verdery provides an analytic scheme of property arrange-
ments under socialism which, in spite of variations in one country or another,
offers nevertheless a framework which could be applied all over the region.32
First, according to this scheme,from the perspective of communism as a cul-
tural system and as organisation of power, property was in the 'real existing
characterises similar developments in common and civil law of the period, see for exam-
ple Kenneth Vandevelde, 'The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development
of the Modem Concept of Law', Buffalo Law Review 29 (1980) 325.
30 For example Poland, where the Jaruzelski regime was forced in the early 1980s to grant
constitutional standing to private landownership, and Hungary, where similar changes
occurred, were in many ways dissimilar to Romania, and to other CEE countries, where a
stricter 'socialist' regime was applied with respect to property. Verdery is aware of such
differences when she observes that 'Even to speak of socialist property already oversim-
plifies, homogenizing a reality that was much more complex and varied across both space
and time, with several parallel property arrangements coexisting at any given moment.'
Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (n 27) 47.
31 See e.g. Katherine Verdery, 'The Obligations of Ownership: Restoring Rights to Land in
Postsocialist Transylvania', in: Katherine Verdery and Caroline Humphrey (eds), Property
in Question: Value Transformation in the Global Economy (Oxford and New York: Berg,
2004) 139, and Humphrey and Verdery, 'Introduction: Raising Questions about Property',
in: Verdery and Humphrey (eds), Property in Question i.
32 See generally Katherine Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare: Property and Value in Postsocialist
Transylvania (Cornell University Press, 2003). In this scheme, property is seen as simulta-
neously a cultural system, an organisation of power, and sets of social relations, all com-
ing together in social processes. Ibid. 48.
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socialism' more an administrative matter than a legal one.33 Therefore, it
was governed by administrative measures which involved a high degree of
discretion, rather than by legal procedures aiming at creating regularity or
certainty.34 The consequence of this characteristic was that the communist
decrees and administrative procedures were more important than the laws in
matters related to property. And the former were regarded 'as having the force
of law but not created through a legislative process.'35 This characteristic had
enormous implications in terms of property redistribution after the fall of
communism, as in time the communist administrative procedures would cre-
ate the sort of operational rules of property administration often at odds with
the formal law, and so entrenched in the local psyche as to prevail over the
formal law enacted from the centre. 36
Second, and also from the perspective of communism as a cultural sys-
tem and as organisation of power, the real existing socialism divided prop-
erty on the basis of the identity of owners and of the social relations among
them. Such division was in sharp contrast with the pre-communist legal divi-
sions and with the Western legal systems' division of property based on prop-
erty types (for example, real and personal, or state, commons and private).37
Thus, socialist law recognised four property types: state, cooperative, personal,
and private. Each type had its own regime and each related to one of the
three main property subjects: state, cooperatives, and individuals or house-
holds.38 These three classes of subjects were distinguished in the socialist
law precisely by their property status, respectively by the type of property
and objects which they were empowered to own.39 In addition, crucial to
the socialist concepts of property were two ideas related to the property of the
state. First, there was the idea that state property formed an inalienable and
33 Ibid 48.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 For an example of such operational rules aptly manipulated by the former socialist local
elites in charge of 'restitution, see Katherine Verdery 'Seeing Like a Mayor. Or, How Local
Officials Obstructed Romanian Land Restitution, Ethnography 3(1) (2002) 5.
37 Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32) 49. We should note, however, that the attachment of
property to (the civil status of) persons, i.e. the dejure understanding of property, has
roots in Roman law, and serves as the basis of the Hegelian argument for property based
on personality development. See Alan Carter, Philosophical Foundations ofProperty Rights
(n 13) 94-97.
38 Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32) 49.
39 Ibid. 50.
GLOBAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3 (2014) 137-185
147
DAMSA
indivisible fund, immune from attachment of debts.4 0 Second, there was the
right of direct (operational) administration of state property (or the idea
of 'administrative rights' on state property). 4 1 Equally important were the 'hier-
archical relations of property forms' established in communism. In these
hierarchical relations, 'state property was prior to all others and it enjoyed
full legal protection, while (in descendent order) cooperative, personal and
private property' were delegated to inferior ranks and enjoyed less protection
than state property. 42 In other words,'socialist state property was more inalien-
able, more exclusive and more property' than any other form of property,43
and the rights held at each level of the hierarchy constrained those at the
inferior levels."
Third, and from a dynamic perspective of communism as a cultural system
and as an oranisation of power, the socialist hierarchy of property types was
producing what Verdery called, following Gluckmann's insights, a'hierarchy of
estates of administration.'45 In such a hierarchy, characteristic of redistributive
systems, the supreme owner of the land allows for grants to its hierarchical
40 Ibid. 5o The idea resembles somehow the ideas related to state patrimony which could
be found in Western civil law, for example. However, in the civil law systems there is
an important distinction between the public and the private patrimony of the state.
Accordingly to this distinction only the public patrimony forms an indivisible and inalien-
able fund. The private property of the state can be attached to public actors as, for
example, in the case of public utilities and then be assigned, contracted out, sold,
etc., exactly as any other private actor's property, because the state acts as any pri-
vate actor with respect to this private property. This later possibility was inexistent in
socialist law.
41 Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32) 50. See also Aurdlian lonasco, 'Les types et les formes
de propri6th en droit socialiste' (The types and forms of property in socialist law), Revue
internationale de droitcompard 21(3) (1969) 499 at 504-505, for a description of the 'opera-
tional right' of direct administration of socialist property in socialist law.
42 Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32) 51. The application of Max Gluckman's anthropo-
logical insights (derived from his observation of African societies) to communist realities
was first utilised by Caroline Humphrey in her pioneering study on a Soviet collective
farm; see Caroline Humphrey, Karl Marx Collective: Economy, Politics and Religion on a
Siberian Collective Farm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). See also Chris
Hann, 'A New Double Movement? Anthropological Perspectives on Property in the Age of
Neoliberalism', Socio-Economic Review 5 (2007) 287 at 295.
43 Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32) 51.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid 56. In this respect Verdery appears to follow Caroline Humphrey's application of
Max Gluckman's insights to communist arrangements of property, even if Verdery does
not mention this explicitly.
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inferiors. These inferiors could further grant rights downwards, similarly to the
ways in which such grants were allotted in feudalism.46 Although any holder of
such a grant could behave as the owner of the objects granted, she could not
alienate permanently the object of the grant. Therefore, in practice nobody
saw these downward allocations as diminishing or dismembering the owner-
ship at the centre, since the centre could annul the grants discretionarily at any
given moment
In the 'real existing socialism, this would mean that the 'party-state retained
its claim to supreme ownership;47 even if it exercised that ownership by pass-
ing the rights downward to lower-level entities. The party state would thus
assign various kinds of control over parts of the property of the whole people
to inferior levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Recipients of these rights could
further parcel them out to other recipients, still lower down the scale. For
example, a ministry could assign such ownership rights to its regional branch,
then to county-level planning structures, and finally to a state farm director.48
Nevertheless, the rights transmitted these ways were prevented by a complex
set of rules from becoming fully autonomous.49
WAhat further distinguished the 'rights' associated with these socialist
'administrative estates' from the rights associated with the patrimonies of
juridical persons in Western and in pre-communist law was that the lower-
level entities were granted a sort of 'administrative right' on the estates. 50 The
authors who analysed such administrative rights resisted the temptation to
associate the right to administrate state socialist property for productive use
with the civil law usus or usufructus, since the 'socialist' administrative rights
were different and had more of a suigeneris character.51 Verdery even prefers
46 Ibid
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid 57.
49 Ibid, based on Dunn: 'The heads of these lower units were to use the rights to generate
products for the state to appropriate and redistribute; meanwhile, complex rules of
accounting aimed to prevent them from obtaining the information they would need
in order to become fully autonomous.' See also Elizabeth Dunn, 'Accounting for
Change', in: Mihaela Kelemen and Monika Kostera (eds), Critical Management Research in
Eastern Europe: Managing the Transition (London: Palgrave, 2002) 38.
50 Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32) 57.
51 Ibid 57. See also Randy Bregman and Dorothy C. Lawrence, 'New Developments in Soviet
Property Law, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 28 (1990) 189 at 191, for the point
that 'under operative management principles, the Soviet State assigns limited ownership
rights to various state organisations that produce goods and performs services. These
assigned rights include the possession, use and disposition of property.'
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to introduce a new category for them, namely 'estates of production.'52 This
denomination has the merit of suggesting the scope of such rights, although it
is not perfectly clear in Verdery's description what exact 'rights' such estates
would involve, what the boundaries between the administrative and produc-
tive estates would be, or whether in practice they would not overlap.53
Nevertheless, her conclusion that this system of 'multiple and overlapping
administrative rights' over the 'state's unitary fund' allowed in practice for
more or less similar transactions to those occurring in capitalist economies
seems to be valid. Furthermore, it is Verdery's additional insight which cap-
tures the dynamics of the process - the fact that socialism allowed for transac-
tions of socialist property objects without changing the 'socialist' character of
this property. Thus, accordingly to Verdery, such transactions did not involve
any change in ownership. What changed hands was in fact the administrative
right over one product or another, the state remaining in theory the owner of
the respective product.54 Finally, an additional factor which made such'social-
ist arrangements' related to property so distinctive was 'the right of socialist
managers to move items of socialist property around at will,55 in huge net-
works of trading made by similar socialist managers of state enterprises.
The consequence of such practices, as Verdery aptly showed, was that in
time all the boundaries within the state's unitary fund ofproperty were blurred,
as objects moved among various people and juridical entities exercising rights
on them similar to property rights, but not recognised as such.56 This blurring
of boundaries within the state property would produce hoarding, dissimula-
tion, plan bargaining, and manipulations of state property by managers. All
these negative phenomena would eventually contribute to the dismissal of the
idea of the state as a unitary actor and that of coherent planning.57 In addition,
52 Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32) 57.
53 Ibid. Following Gluckman, again, Verdery describes the difference between the two kinds
of estates as follows: 'Superiors hold estates of administration, allocating rights down-
ward, whereas those at the base hold estates of production, using the rights granted them
to fructify collective assets.' Verdery also appears to see these 'estates of production' as
being dynamic and generating a constant vertical conflict between the centre and the
higher echelons and the periphery and the lower echelons to which the estates were
granted. 'It seems that sources of tension between these two kinds of estates, a conse-
quence of these latter rights in the socialist case, was a steady erosion of the center's
capacity to grant the former, administrative ones', ibid 57.
54 Ibid 58.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid 58-59.
57 Ibid.
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this blurring of boundaries within the state property would also greatly com-
plicate the assessment of value and ownership rights during post-communist
privatisation (or restitution). As Verdery correctly observed, by the time resti-
tution and privatisation were announced, many of the 'socialist' directors
were becoming private owners, in a process 'that socialism's hierarchy of
administrative estates had facilitated.'58 This inability of the centre to control
the managers and productive estates was not only critical in eroding the
communist states' legitimacy and initiating the post-socialist transformations.
It also set the stage for the havoc played by the powerful communist techno-
cratic elites on the state property, in the conditions of a much weakened
post-socialist state.59
The major differences between the communist and the post-communist
organisation of property are provided in Table 1.
Besides the above traits of property under socialism, several additional
characteristics smoothed the functioning of socialist property. These addi-
tional characteristics allow us to understand the survival and pervasiveness of
communist operational rules during post-communist transformations, and also
the profound illegitimacy of these rules, so it worth mentioning them.
First, it should be noted that the socialist system of property was rendered
operational and running by a sophisticated network of barter and gifts among
socialist managers. This network of barter and gifts was far more important
than the formal communist decrees and regulations related to socialist prop-
erty. Thus, the socialist managers lived not only in a hierarchy of estates but
also in an economy of shortage with few penalties for irrational or inefficient
behaviour. These socialist managers had to hide labour and materials provided
by the state or produced by themselves above the planned targets, in order to
improve their output. Such hoarded labour and materials were traded or
exchanged for reciprocal favours in the horizontal and vertical networks which
operated in the socialist state, and after 1989 proved to be major sources
of social capital.60 The obligations and reciprocity resulting from the opera-
tion of these networks were highly binding for the socialist managers, although
58 Ibid.
59 Venelin I. Ganev, Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria after 1989 (Cornell
University Press, 2007). Political backlashes in Poland and Hungary accompanied the
communist states''liberalisation' of corporate regimes before 1989, as this 'liberalisation'
was followed immediately by nomenklatura privatisations.
6o Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32) 6o-61. See also 'Symposium: Postsocialist Pathways:
Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe, East European Constitutional
Review 9 (2oo) 101.
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TABLE I Characteristics ofproperty under socialism
Property
Perspective Under communism Pre- and post-communism
(continental, civil legal systems)
Property as a cultural
system and organisa-
tion of power (static)
Property as a
cultural system
and organisation
of power (static)
Property as a
cultural system
and organisation
of power
Legal
Administrative matter
(administrative decrees prevail
over laws, administrative practices
prevail)
Division of property types on
the basis of identity of owners
and social relations among them
(state, cooperatives
and individuals or households)
Administrative rights over state
property far more important than
any legal (formal) classification
of property
Administrative rights usually not
defined precisely (via the law)
and had porous boundaries
State property inalienable
and indivisible
Characterised by hierarchies of
estates of administration with
porous boundaries
Goods moved freely between
porous hierarchies
Socialist law 'imported' all
definitions of property from
pre-communist law
Legal matter
Division of property on the
basis of property types (e.g. real
and personal, or state, com-
mons, and private)
No such'administrative rights'; law
defines the right of administration
precisely
'Right of administration' usually
defined as a legal institution
(e.g. via mandate, institution
precisely defined by civil codes)
or as part of the 'bundle of rights'
(e.g. use) with precise boundaries
State property treated as ordinary
'private property' when state
engages in private transactions
No such 'hierarchies'
Goods could only move between
clearly delimited 'patrimonies',
usually on the basis of contract
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not required at all by the formal system. And in time, these practices of manipu-
lation of collective property to ensure production (quotas), which depended not
only on good relations of the communist technocracy with superiors in a chain
of command but also on good relations of these communist technocrats with
their equals or inferiors, consolidated. In other words, behind the curtain of com-
munist decrees and regulations, what rendered the system operational was a
sophisticated network of barter and gifts which kept the system running.61
Second, the socialist regime, while tolerating the practices of socialist man-
gers, discouraged severely the appropriation of socialist property's objects by
direct producers. Such appropriation was categorised as 'theft' and strictly
punished.62 Therefore, the strategies of the socialist managers to hide labour
and materials and trade them for reciprocal favours had the potential to
put these socialist managers in conflict with the direct producers. For example,
the producers could hardly understand the socialist regime's acceptance of
the managers' practices to move things upward, between the boundaries of the
hierarchies of socialist estates, or laterally, within the fuzzy socialist categories.
This acceptance contrasted sharply with the same socialist regime's rejection
of producers' practices to move things downward, across the boundary
between socialist property and lower types, and with the severe punishment
contemplated by direct producers for such practices. Similarly, the direct pro-
ducers could not understand why the communist state tolerated the appro-
priation of socialist property by managers who were feathering their own
nests. Obviously, the communist state tolerated such practices of socialist
managers for various reasons, having to do with the inner logic of the system.
For example, the managers' role in the lubrication of the planned economy
and the enhancement of officials' position of authority within it, or their posi-
tion as efficient communist cadres,63 were important reasons for the socialist
61 Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32) 62. With respect to the functioning of networks of
reciprocal gifts and favours, Verdery makes the following observation: 'Socialist firms
were not units at the end of a chain of command but were linked in extended webs of
managers and politicians, all striking bargains to optimize their situations. If we stop with
the allocation of administrative rights, we miss this crucial aspect of socialist property, so
dependent on a corresponding system of obligations.'
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid. Verdery gives the example of a state cooperative manager who decided to cultivate
an idle field without authority and appropriating the surplus for himself. While the pro-
ducers saw such practice as outright theft, the manager replicated that, albeit the field
was idle anyway and the 'system' did not require him to put it on productive use (this
would be a sort of Lockean argument), part of the appropriation was marked for 'atten-
tions' to higher state bureaucrats who had the last word on plan quotas and allocations of
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state to tolerate communist managers' misappropriation of socialist property.
Moreover, the deferential treatment of socialist managers in cases of misap-
propriation of socialist property was embedded in the organisation of socialist
property, with its priority of administration over legal regulation, its hierar-
chy of property types, and its specificity with respect to assets evaluation.
Nevertheless, it was hard to justify to direct producers this unequal treatment
in cases of misappropriations of state property. And in time such unequal
treatment increased the illegitimacy of the socialist regime.
To conclude so far, the socialist system entailed a very complex system of
property.64 In such a system, Verdery's observation that in order to grasp the
system workings one has to set aside questions related to ownership, and look
instead at the patterns of use, administrative rights and social networks of
exchange and reciprocity, is probably more than pertinent. In this context, the
establishment by the communist states of hierarchies of 'administrative and
productive estates, and the preference of communist states for political-
administrative decisions over legal procedures, paved the way for the restitu-
tion and privatisation's logistical nightmares encountered post-1989 all over
CEE. 6 5 In addition, the 'real existing' socialist regime of property did not estab-
lish among people and things relations which rested mainly on commodifica-
tion.66 Because the relations among people and things were not based primarily
on commodification, the evaluation of resources within the socialist property
was not driven by the market but by politics. Thus, post-1989 it became excru-
ciatingly difficult to assess the value of the assets being privatised, as the state
had absorbed the liabilities of its subordinate firms. 6 7 In the end, the 'solution'
often found by the former socialist mangers to this evaluation problem was to
decrease massively the value of the state's assets to be privatised. As observed
by Verdery, this decrease was made possible by the third aspect of the socialist
property regime, namely its ranked hierarchy of property forms.68 This social-
ist hierarchy of property forms produced a powerful stratum of
'state-enterprise directors who could extract maximum benefits from the state
resources vital for the realisation of the plan, and part to hierarchical equals who could
reciprocate by providing tools for the production, so such practice improved his standing
and consequently the cooperative's standing within the system. Ibid 62-68.
64 Ibid 41.
65 Ibid 73.
66 Ibid 74.
67 Ibid 75.
68 With state property at the top, followed by cooperatives, and individuals/households at
the bottom.
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resources and from their control of administrative rights over (former) social-
ist estates of production.'69 Moreover, this ranked hierarchy of property forms
was also characterised by the huge gap between the law in the books and law
in action specific to socialist societies.70 Therefore, in such a socialist hierarchy
of property forms, it was arguably more important to understand first and
foremost the unwritten operational rules of the societal subsystems which
law governed than to understand the formal law. The written law could only
provide an inherently limited understanding of categories such as 'socialist
property.'
3 Law and Communist Property
With respect to the socialist'formal law, several observations should be made.
First, it should be noted the communist regimes never abolished 'private prop-
erty' from the 'law in the books.' Thus, in the communist era, private property
was a well-defined category, kept more or less in line with the concept of prop-
erty of the pre-communist era codes. What changed in the formal law of pri-
vate property during the communistera, in comparison with the pre-communist
times, was therefore not the definition of property, which was very much the
same, but the restrictions placed on possessing various objects in private prop-
erty.7 It was the ownership of such objects which was drastically curtailed by
various regulations during communism, 72 not the private ownership as such.
As a consequence of such restrictions, the acquisition of private property
and the right of disposal of objects of property (i.e. what could constitute
'private property, or how the property could be alienated, contracted, given by
testament, etc.) were drastically curtailed. However, this curtailment was not
69 Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32) 76.
70 1 refer to the distinction introduced by Roscoe Pound. See Roscoe Pound, 'Law in the
Books and Law in Action, American Law Review 44 (1910) 12. For the excruciating prob-
lems posed by such differences to the students of 'socialist law', see e.g. Maimon
Schwarzschild, 'Review. Variations on an Enigma: Law in Practice and Law on the Books
in the USSR', Harvard Law Review 99 (1986) 685.
71 For example, the so-called 'means of production' could not constitute the object of 'pri-
vate property' during communist times.
72 Such regulations could be found in the 'first generation' communist decrees of the late
1940s, for example, which nationalised all the 'means of production', and in the myriad of
administrative acts which implemented such decrees during the same period, some in
excess of or contrary to these given decrees. Afterwards, they could be contained in the
laws, decrees and administrative decisions issued by the communist authorities.
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necessarily realised directly, by a change in the formal definitions of private
property in the civil codes; it was realised mostly indirectly, by constitutional
and administrative regulations which could touch civil law matters such as
inheritance,73 contracts, 74 and so on. With all these formal restrictions placed
on the object of private property, and this point should be stressed again, the
communist regime however never entirely abolished private property.75
Moreover, it has seen 'personal property' as complementary to the establish-
ment of a socialist society.7 6 As the noted American legal scholar and specialist
in socialist lawJohn N. Hazard observed:
[A]s Marx and Engels stated specifically in their Communist Manifesto
'The Distinguishing feature of communism is not the abolition of prop-
erty generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property.' The revolutionar-
ies in Russia, as well as their fellows in Hungary, Germany and ultimately
China, remembered the teachings of Marx and Engels when they had a
chance to seize power after the last war ... The formula was compara-
73 See e.g. Inga Markovits, 'Hedgehogs or Foxes? A Review of Westen's and Schleider's
Zivilrecht im Systemvergleich', American Journal of Comparative Law 34 (1986) 113, for
the point that inheritance law served different purposes in the socialist countries in com-
parison with the 'Western' ones. But see John Quigley, 'Socialist Law and the Civil Law
Tradition', Americanjournal of Comparative Law 37(4) (1989) 781 at 8oi, for the continuity
with civil law tradition on these matters in socialist times.
74 See WJ. Wagner, 'The Law of Contracts in Communist Countries (Russia, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, St Louis University LawJournal 7 (1962-1963) 292 at 295.
75 Article lo of the 1936 ussa Constitution confirms the right of Soviet citizens to 'personal
property' (it is no longer called private, as it was under the 1922 RSFSR Civil Code of 1922,
copied after a French model. The comparative legal literature on this point is too volumi-
nous to be cited extensively here. Suffice it to say that there is a consensus with respect to
the existence of private property in socialist countries, and to mention, by way of exam-
ple: John N. Hazard, 'Soviet Property Law, Cornell Law Quarterly 30 (1945) 466; John
N. Hazard, 'Soviet Property Law and Social Change, BritishJournal of Sociology 4(1) (1953)
1; Samuel Kucherov, 'Property in the Soviet Union, American journal of Comparative Law
11(3) (1962) 376; Paul Betts, 'Private Property and Public Culture: A Forgotten Chapter of
East European Communist Life, Histoire@Politique: Politique, culture, socidtd, no. 7,
January-April 2oo9, http://www.histoire-politique.fr/indexphp?numero=07&rub=dossie
r&item=71; William Partlett, 'Reclassifying Russian Law: Mechanisms, Outcomes, and
Solutions for an Overly Politicized Field', Columbia Journal of Eastern European Law 2(1)
(2008) 1.
76 Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32). For the various changes in soviet policy related to
'personal property, until it became firmly embedded and accepted in the Soviet legal
doctrine, see Hazard, 'Soviet Property Law, Cornell Law Quarterly 30 (1945) 466.
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tively simple - destroy private ownership in the means of production,
but do not eliminate private ownership in consumer's goods.77
Therefore, albeit the private property was delegated to an inferior rank in the
socialist 'hierarchies of estates', if it was an estate at all,78 it never ceased to
exist in legal form. Furthermore, the pre-communist civil codes which regu-
lated this property subsisted long in the socialist period before being replaced
by 'socialist codes.' Moreover, these socialist codes borrowed heavily from the
same pre-communist codes.79 For example, Czechoslovakia was the only CEE
socialist country which adopted entirely new socialist codes in the 196os.80 The
former G DR was unable to adopt a socialist code until the 1970s. 8 1 Both countries
used until the adoption of such codes amended versions of pre-communist
civil legislation. And, in the rather exceptional case of Romania, the pre-
communist civil or commercial codes were never replaced.82 Moreover, the
drafters of communist laws were borrowing heavily from the continental civil
law notion of patrimony when defining the state dominium, placed at the top
of the hierarchy of socialist estates. But patrimony in the civil law tradition is a
concept which rests on the idea of private property.
77 Ibid 467.
78 For a discussion on the continuity of recognition of private property during socialist
times, see Kazimierz Grzybowski,'Continuity of Law in Eastern Europe, Americanjournal
of Comparative Law 6 (1957) 44.
79 For such an argument related to the borrowing in the case of Hungary, whose 1959 'social-
ist' civil code was strongly influenced by the pre-WWIlI civil code drafts, especially
the 1928 draft, see Andris Kisfaludi, 'The Influence of Harmonization of Private Law
on the Development of the Civil Law in Hungary'juridica International 14 (2008) 130 at
131. For the earlier Hungarian and Polish 'socialist' civil codes, see Kazimierz Grzybowski,
'Reform of Civil Law in Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union, American journal of
Comparative Law lo (ig61) 253.
8o See e.g. George E. Glos, 'The Czechoslovak Civil Code of 1964 and its 1982 Amendment
within the Framework of Czechoslovak Civil Law', New York Law School journal of
International and Comparative Law 6 (1985-1986) 232.
81 See e.g. Inga S. Markovits, 'Civil Law in East Germany - Its Development and Relation to
Soviet Legal History and Ideology', Yale LawJournal 78 (1968-1969)1 (for an excellent his-
tory of the intellectual ideas of the German and Soviet civil codes). See also A.K.R. Kiralfy,
'Legislation: The Civil Code of the German Democratic Republic (Das ZGB der DDR),
Review ofSocialistLaw 5 (1979) 79 (for a brief description of the main characteristics of the
Eastern Germany Civil Code).
82 See e.g. VD. Zlatescu and I. Moroianu-Zlatescu,'Le droit roumain dans le systhme romano-
germanique' (Romanian law in the Romano-German system), Revue internationale de
droit compard 43(4) (1991) 829-836.
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In addition to a degree of statutory continuity in civil law matters, there was
continuity with the legal thought of the pre-war period. At least after the
Stalinist period, the learned scholars of the communist countries looked
beyond the communist statutory rules to the interwar period scholarship, in
order to find more permanent legal thought 'formants' in which the socialist
categories could be explained.8 3
Furthermore, this continuity was not limited to civil law. The pre-communist
commercial codes, other possible formal sources dealing with private property
relations, had an 'afterlife' in the communist CEE. 8 4 For example, these codes
could never be formally repealed during the socialist period, even if they were
indirectly amended and not in widespread use, as in the case of Romania and
Hungary.85 Or, the socialist codes could directly import major concepts from
the pre-communist commercial codes, as was the case of the Eastern German,
Polish and Czechoslovak laws regulating international trade. For instance,
while discussing the Czechoslovak economic code of 1964 in relation to the old
Czechoslovak commercial code, Gloss notes that 'although the Czechoslovak
communist regime preserved many provisions of the commercial code in the
code of international trade, a commercial code stricto sensu was never
enacted.'86 Equally, Gloss observes that 'many provisions of the commercial
codes - supplemented by those of the civil code dealing especially with
businessmen, contracts in general, sales, insurance, banking, warehouses, the
carriage of goods, etc. - survived in the code of international trade, enacted
in 1963, and in the 1988 Law on Joint Ventures.'87 And a similar example of
83 See e.g. Gianmaria F. Ajani, 'The Supremacy of Statutory Law in Socialist Countries:
Scholarly Opinions and Operative Rules, Review of Socialist Law n (1985) 123. See also
John Quigley, 'Socialist Law and the Civil Law Tradition' (n 73) 802-808 (for an ample
review of the 'socialist' legal scholars sustaining the continuity); Rudolfo Sacco, 'The
Romanist Substratum in the Civil Law of the Socialist Countries', Review of Socialist Law
14 (1988) 65; and Mihaly, 'The Role of Civil Law Institutions in the Management of
Communist Economies: The Hungarian Experience, American journal of Comparative
Law 8 (1959) 310.
84 For a discussion of the commercial law in CEE and the USSR at it stood in 1989, see e.g.
Hubert Izdebski, 'A Revival of Commercial Law in the Soviet Union and Other European
Socialist Countries', Review of Socialist Law 15 (1989) 365.
85 For Hungary, see e.g. Tamis Sdrkozy, The Law of the Institutional System of Market
Economy in Hungary and the European Union', Begegnungen Schriftenreihe des Europa
Institutes Budapest 25 (2005) 31 at 35.
86 George E. Glos, 'The New Czechoslovak Commercial Code', Review of Central and Eastern
European Law 18 (1992) 555-
87 Ibid. For the massive borrowing of Western concepts and the total lack of 'socialist
imagination' in the Czechoslovak Code of International Trade, see George E. Glos,
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'socialist' borrowing from the pre-war codification work in the field of private
international law could be found in Poland.88
Evidently the borrowing was not limited to the law regulating international
trade or to the field of private international law. It extended to many substan-
tive fields, such as those related to joint ventures" or the laws allowing for the
formation of commercial and private enterprises.90 Hungary, for example,
which was also a 'champion' of socialist economic reforms, introduced joint
ventures in its domestic 'socialist' legislation as early as 197291 and amended
this legislation in 1977.92 This legislation, and the alternative model to that of
Soviet law on which it was based, further spread to other socialist countries
and to the former USSR in the 1980S.93 Its influence on the elaboration of simi-
lar laws in socialist countries could be seen as an example of a broader trend
of the period in which the sovietisation of the law of the CE E countries, char-
acteristic of an earlier period, was reversed, and models alternative to the
'The Czechoslovak Law of Sale', Review of Socialist Law 4 (1978) 1o6 at 143. For a very
descriptive account of the ways in which the Czechoslovak socialist revamping of the
former codes by enacting a new 'socialist' Civil Code, the Economic Code and the Code of
International Trade made necessary the post-communist enacting of a new Commercial
Code, see Josef Bejcek, 'The New Commercial Code of the Czech Republic',John Marshal
Law Review 30 (1996-1997) 699.
88 Dominik Lasok, 'The Polish System of Private International Law, American journal of
Comparative Law 15 (1966-1967) 330 at 331.
89 Which were also a product of late communism, introduced first by Yugoslavia in 1967,
followed by Romania in 1971, Hungary in 1972, Poland in 1976, 1979 and 1982, Bulgaria in
1980, and Czechoslovakia in 1988. The ussa also adopted a law on joint ventures in 1987.
go For example, the Romanian Law on Commercial Societies No. 31 of 1991, which used as a
major source of inspiration the drafts of the Civil and Commercial Codes made before
wwn, in the reign of King Carol II, but never enacted as formal law. The drafters of the
pre-war codes were heavily influenced by the German and Italian commercial law doc-
trines, the most progressive at the time.
91 Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 281, 1972 (X,3 ), amended in 1977, by Decree of the
Minister of Finance No. 7/1977 (V,6).
92 See e.g. George G. Lorinczi, 'u.s.-Hungarian Joint Ventures, International Business Law lo
(1982) 113
93 See e.g. Petru Buzescu, 'Joint-Ventures in Eastern Europe, American journal of Com-
parative Law 32 (1984) 407, for a discussion of 'joint ventures' in CEE socialist law. For the
American origins of the joint ventures transplant, and for its applications in the Asian
and socialist countries, see M. Dornarajah, Law ofInternationalJoint Ventures (Singapore:
Longman, 1992). The joint ventures received a great deal of attention in the legal literature
in the 1970s and '8os; therefore we cannot cite here all the relevant literature on the
subject.
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Soviet law were affirmed through the CEE and eventually were adopted in the
former USSR. 9 4
Therefore, in spite of the perversion of the spirit of civil codes, or the limited
use of commercial codes during communist times,95 the formal dispositions of
such codes regulating private property were similar to those of pre-socialist
times and, arguably, an important part of the 'law on the books' when commu-
nism imploded in CEE. Moreover, important groundwork on civil law matters
had already been done in the interwar period in almost all the CEE countries
even when new codes were not enacted. The proposals for new Romanian civil
and commercial codes during Carol II's reign in the late 1930s, never enacted
because of Carol's forced abdication and Romania's subsequent entry into the
war, exemplify such groundwork. Similarly, the Czechoslovak work on civil and
commercial reform in the 1930s, not enacted because of Anschluss,96 and the
Polish proposals for unification and reformation of the civil and commercial
legislation in the interwar period, not enacted because of Poland's entry into
the war, show that the interwar groundwork on civil and commercial law mat-
ters was not limited to Romania. In addition, there is evidence that, at least
partially, this interwar groundwork influenced the reflection of socialist era
lawmakers.97 This interwar work was also an important source of local inspira-
tion, available for outright enactment at the onset of the post-communist
period.98 Although there is debate in the scholarship as to the utility of such
94 Gianmaria Ajani, 'La circulation de modales juridiques dans le droit post-socialiste, Revue
internationale de droit compard 46(4) (1994) 1087 at 1090.
95 The residual dispositions of the commercial codes surviving the initial communist waves
of abrogation were never used openly or widely in 'real existing socialism, but were put to
discrete use by the various corporate entities controlled by the political police involved in
the foreign trade dealings of the communist states.
96 Glos, 'The New Czechoslovak Commercial Code' (n 86).
97 See e.g. Kazimierz Grzybowski, 'Reform and Codification of Polish Laws, American
Journal of Comparative Law 7 (1958) 393, for a discussion of the conscious effort of late
1950s Polish drafters of the socialist codes to continue the interwar legal tradition. A simi-
lar influence is discernable in the work on the Romanian 'socialist civil code' commission
in the late 1960s, although the proposed civil code was not enacted, the Romanian author-
ities preferring to keep in force the Civil Code of 1865. Interestingly enough, where the
Romanian authorities decided to replace portions of this code with 'socialist laws, as in
the case of 'physical or juridical persons, family, etc., the interwar work on the civil code
informed the choices of the socialist lawmakers.
98 For a well-documented study of the subtle intellectual and institutional path-
dependency of post-communist policy and legislative developments in the case of social
security and general welfare covering Poland, Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia,
see Tomasz Inglot, Welfare States in East Central Europe 1919-2004 (Cambridge University
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work and the need to completely replace the socialist era civil and commercial
regulations with new codes,99 it is beyond doubt that the interwar groundwork
inspired local choices after the implosion of the socialist system.100 Moreover,
the legal transformations and experiments with more 'liberal' property and
companies' regimes began in the USSR and in CEE communist countries, such
as Hungary and Poland, at least several years before the post-1989 momentum
and constrained the post-communist choices.10'
Finally, the legal boundaries of a state enterprise were also more or less clear
post-1989, at least in the formal law, as the communist era legal drafters, when
modifying the socialist civil codes, borrowed heavily from the pre-socialist
legal imagery. Therefore, almost all the necessary legal foundations of a
Press, 2008). The tongue durde focus of Inglot's study allows for the identification of the
complex pre-communist and communist era intellectual inspiration of various policies
and also for the identification of the path-dependent institutional development of such post-
communist policies. Nevertheless, there are no similar single-country or comparative
studies which could document the interplay of the pre-communist and communist era
ideas and institutions related to civil and commercial law, the only study which comes
close to that of Inglot's with respect to breadth and historical coverage being that of
lstvin Poginy related to restitution (Poginy, Righting Wrongs in Eastern Europe (n 1)),
which nevertheless is singular in the field.
99 See e. g. Thomas Waelde and James Gunderson, 'Legislative Reform in Transition
Economies: Western Transplants - A Shortcut to Social Market Economy Status?,
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43 (1994) 347, for an argument related to the
need for more than cosmetic changes in socialist codes in the post-communist period.
For a review of the arguments in favour of new codification as a method of preventing
unsystematic reception, see Pierre Legrand, 'Strange Power of Words: Codification
Situated', Tlane European and Civil Law Forum 9 (1995) '.
ioo See e.g. Gianmaria Ajani and Ugo Mattei, 'Codifying Property Law in the Process
of Transition: Some Suggestions from Comparative Law and Economics, Hastings
International and Comparative Law Review 19 (1995-1996) 117, for the initial perception of
socialist codes as adequate for post-communist transformations and for a moderated
argument related to the lowering of information costs which consolidated codes would
provide.
oi See e.g. Marshall 1. Goldman, The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry
(London and New York: Routledge, 2003) 74-75, for a discussion on how Russia's privatisa-
tion was shaped by regulations passed during the Gorbachev era. See also Wladimir
Andreff, 'Transition through Different Corporate Governance Structures in Postsocialist
Economies: Which Convergence?', in: Henk Overbeek, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and
Andreas N6lke (eds), The Transnational Politics of Corporate Governance Regulation
(London and New York: Routledge, 2007) 155 at 158, for the point that the legal transfor-
mations of corporate structures and governance in the last years of communism led to a
virtual takeover by insiders, managers and/or employees in nearly all the CEE countries.
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Western conception of property, even if not all, existed already in the social-
ist era codes, or otherwise were easily to be found in pre-socialist proposals
for civil or commercial codes and borrowed from there. Moreover, if formal
property law was somehow missing or otherwise could not be borrowed from
previous indigenous legislative proposals, plenty of Western sources of inspira-
tion were readily available for expeditious import.
4 Communist Property Transformation(S): Formal Law and
Operational Rules
Yet, with all these characteristics of the formal law of property, when commu-
nism imploded in CEE and the communist property started to be transformed
into private property, nobody could escape the apocalyptic feelings described
by Verdery. 02 If the people could attach to such transformation of property
apocalyptic imagery, there might arguably be more out there than the simple
problem of the formal law of property in the transition to post-socialist prop-
erty regimes. What contributed to this feeling becomes clearer if we consider
some fundamental differences between the socialist and the Western organisa-
tion of property. For example, the organisation of socialist property in hier-
archies of estates implied the allocation of socialist property to socialist
enterprises for direct administration. These socialist enterprises were regu-
lated under formal law similarly to the ways in which the Western corporations
were regulated under Western law.103 However, what differed a great deal in
socialism was what these socialist enterprises, organised as corporate enti-
ties, could do with socialist property. Thus, such socialist corporate entities
directly administered socialist property which was fuzzy, but, more impor-
tantly, the socialist administrators could move items of socialist property
almost at will between various corporate entities. 104 By contrast, the Western
corporations could move private property objects among corporate entities
only as a result of contracts or formal acts. Unlike the socialist property which
had fuzzy boundaries, the Western property was clearly delimited. Therefore,
if we take into consideration these differences, it becomes evident that if
102 Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32).
103 As the communist lawmakers preserved in the 'socialist' legislation the pre-socialist codes,
legal categories and distinctions related to juridical persons, even if the 'socialist enter-
prise' had a different social role to accomplish from that of the Western corporation.
104 This move at will of objects of socialist property was made possible by the porous boundar-
ies of such socialist hierarchical estates and by the operational rules of socialist property.
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one considers the transformation of socialist property as the first priority of
post-communism transitions, one will have to address first and foremost the
problem of moving property freely between socialist estates (socialist corporate
entities). Consequently, one has to address the change of the operational rules
which make the moving possible in the first place, since the change of the for-
mal law would not by itself solve the former socialist administrators' behaviour.
How a change in the formal law would lead to a change in the operational
rules is unclear. However, monitoring the former socialist administrators'
activity during the transformation of communist state property into private
property105 and addressing the agency problems would become paramount in
the dismantling of the socialist hierarchies of estates. The enactment of formal
rules related to property would be thus a secondary activity, as these rules were
already in place or otherwise easily imported. 06
Moreover, the private property rules would only be a small part, even if
an important one, of the huge legal infrastructure which would be needed
for an effective functioning of a commercial, market-based economy.0 7 In the
absence of effective regulations dealing with the myriad of possible commer-
cial transactions, investment devices, banks, tax, environmental consider-
ations, zoning, antitrust and consumer protection, to mention just a few of the
directions in which a modern economy expands legal regulation, the simple
regulation and possession of private property would be worthless. No one
would be able to engage their property in meaningful transactions, given the
huge transactional and informational costs resulting from the absence of legal
regulations and effective monitoring of the implementation.108
105 The administrators were largely left in their places after communism imploded in 1989.
io6 The reunified Germany seems to be the only 'country' dealing with specific problems of
such transitions which acknowledged early on the need of monitoring. See John
Borneman, Settling Accounts: Violence, justice and Accountability in Postsocialist Europe
(Princeton University Press, 1997).
107 See e.g. Paul H. Brietzke, 'Designing the Legal Frameworks for Markets in Eastern Europe,
Transnational Law 7 (1994) 35 (discussing the fallacious assumptions of the neoliberal
ideology with respect to what was to be done to transform the command economies of
socialist CEE states into market economies). See also Carol M. Rose, 'Economic Claims
and the Challenges of New Property, in: Verdery and Humphrey (eds), Property in
Question (n 31) 275.
1o8 See e.g. Kathryn Hanley, 'How Russian Enterprises Cope with Payment Problems, Post-
Soviet Affairs 15(3) (1999) 2ox; and Kathryn Hendley, Peter Murrell and Randi Ryterman,
'Law, Relationships and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian
Enterprises', Europe-Asia Studies 52(4) (2000) 627 (for the impact of absence of trust and
the incomplete commercial legal infrastructure in the strategies for the contracts' conclu-
sion and execution adopted by the 'post-communist' Russian enterprises).
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Nonetheless, in the post-communist CEE the priorities were turned upside
down, 09 and priority was given to formal enactments of rules regarding
property, with a complete ignorance of the monitoring and agency
problems."i0 Thus, the difficult conceptual and practical legal problems posed
by this transformation of the hierarchies of socialist estates into distinct cor-
porate entities functioning according to the Western or pre-communist legal
ideas were left unaddressed in the early years of post-communist CEE transi-
tions. Consequently the hierarchies of socialist estates that blurred the tradi-
tional corporate and private/public law boundaries"' continued to exist in fact
for a number of years after 1989. The socialist property organised in hierarchies
of socialist estates and entrusted for direct administration to socialist corpo-
rate forms could not be transformed into private property by simple enact-
ment of formal law. Moreover, socialist corporate forms did not transform into
distinct corporate entities which could be treated equally before the law or
have relationships with the objects of property similar to those which persons,
physical or juridical, could have with the objects of property in the civil-
continental or common law traditions.
1o9 Based on the simplistic assumption that once the property rights were distributed, the
market would magically follow and take care of the rest, and the new private owners'
drive for profits and efficiency would also magically solve the communist countries' stag-
nation. See e.g. Robert B. Seidman, Ann Seidman and Neva Makgetla, 'Big Bangs and
Decision-Making: What Went Wrong, Boston University International Law journal 13
(1995) 435 at 451.
110 See e.g. Paul H. Rubin, 'Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies',
Cornell InternationalLawJournal27 (1994) 1at 2 (for the point that much of the economic
literature on the first years of post-communist transitions focused on property while
ignoring the problems posed by the society based on the market), and Paul H. Brietzke,
'Designing the Legal Frameworks' (n 107). The problems of agency and corporate gover-
nance were also ignored, albeit after the failed voucher privatisation in Russia and the
Czech Republic they become more salient in the legal scholarship under the heading
of corporate governance. See e.g. Jeffrey M. Jordan, 'Patronage and Corruption in the
Czech Republic, sArs Review 12(2) (2002) 19; John C. Coffee, 'Privatization and Corpo-
rate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure, Journal of Corporation
Law 25 (1999) 1; Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman and Anna Tarassova, 'Russian Privati-
zation and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, Stanford Law Review 52
(2000) 1731.
11i See e.g. Mark Freedland and Jean-Bernard Auby (eds), The Public Law/Private Law Divide:
Une entente assez cordiale?La distinction du droit public et du droitprivg: regards frangais
et britanniques (Oxford : Hart Publishing, 2006); Curtis J. Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor,
Law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems and Economic
Development around the World (University of Chicago Press, 2oo8) 4-10.
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Seen from a traditional civil law perspective, the socialist estate and the
socialist firm which administers this estate present several difficult conceptual
problems, which reflects on the conceptual difficulties posed by privatisation
of socialist enterprises. For example, because the patrimony of a socialist
enterprise is fuzzy and has in practice no clear boundaries delimited by law, it
is difficult to delimitate clearly what is lawful and unlawful in the process of
transfer of a socialist enterprise patrimony to a newly formed 'capitalist' corpo-
ration. In the past, any appropriation by the former socialist managers of
objects belonging to the socialist estate would be, at least in theory, unlawful
and susceptible of severe punishment. But with the passage of new corpo-
rate and privatisation laws the boundaries of what was legal and what was ille-
gal were further blurred. Thus, the enactment of corporate and privatisation
laws made the fictional transformation of the socialist corporations into capi-
talist corporate structures not only possible but also mandatory. Similarly the
new laws made the transfer of the patrimony of the old socialist corporations
to the newly created corporate entities mandatory. What these new laws did
not address, however, was the deep level at which socialist organisation of
property operated, a level which created the possibility for socialist mangers to
hoard labour and materials provided by the state. In theory, the capitalist cor-
porations still owned property of the state and it was illegal for such property
to be appropriated by private actors. However, there was an abrupt disappear-
ance of the communist state's institutions which monitored the activity of
managers of socialist estates. 1l2 Therefore, the sole 'arbitrators' of the legality
of the transfer of property from state to private forms were the former socialist
managers, already accustomed to appropriation of state property and transac-
tions on the grey market in the last decades of communism. In other words,
corporate socialist forms characterised by fuzzy legal boundaries were almost
overnight transformed into capitalist corporate forms. These forms were
endowed with property left to be administered by the former socialist manag-
ers, accustomed to act on the margins of socialist legality, which itself was
different from capitalist legality, dominated by formal law. The enormous
monitoring problems posed by such transformation were totally ignored by
the post-communist lawmakers, with little exception. In such a context, the
degree of outright appropriation of state property by the former socialist
112 For a good example of such communist institutions and of the speed with which these
institutions were dismantled by the communist technocratic surviving the Bulgarian
post-communist transition, see Ganev, Preying on the State (n 59). One should note that
such monitoring institutions as those described by Ganev existed in all CEE countries and
in the USSR.
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managers that was seen in post-communist CEE and in the former USSR is not
surprising. The literature describing such appropriations is too wide and other-
wise impossible to cite extensively here, but the details and wide arrays of
methods of appropriation are well documented in Russia and the former cis
countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, as well as in Romania,
Bulgaria and the Balkan countries.113
Besides the problems posed by the fuzzy boundaries of socialist estates and
by the absence of instruments for monitoring the former socialist managers'
illicit activities, the problems associated with the quest for the best structure
of corporate governance and the multiple difficulties faced by the post-
communist countries engaged in such quest were not trivial at all.114 In
the light of Enron and the waves of corporate scandals of the first decade of the
new millennium, the whole corporate model preached by powerful interna-
tional actors to Eastern Europe and to the cis (where it was adopted) came
under closer scrutiny.115 However, this examination, and the reconsideration
of principal-agent issues created by this corporate model, came a little late.
At that moment, the rather simplistic assumptions underlying this Western cor-
porate model which inspired the corporate and 'privatisation laws in CEE and
the former USSR were already damaged by the unforeseen and unintended
113 See e.g. Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32); Ganev, Preying on the State (n 59); Maria Log
and Andrzej Zybertowicz, Privatizing the Police-State: The Case of Poland (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2000). For an example of the conceptual difficulties presented by post-
communist transfers of property, see Nazym Khiknet case, [1996] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports
362 (Sir Thomas Bingham, Evans LJ, and Thorpe LJ) and a commentary on the case
in Emily Haslam, 'The Odessa File: Post Socialist Property Rights in English Courts',
The Modem Law Review 6o(5) (1997) 710.
114 See e.g. Andrei A. Baev, 'The Transformation of the Role of the State in Monitoring
Large Firms in Russia: From the State's Supervision to the State's Fiduciary Duties,
Transnational Law 8 (1995) 247, for an interesting discussion on the conceptual difficul-
ties encountered by civil and socialist lawyers in designing an optimal post-communist
corporate governance structure, in the context of Russian privatisations. See also John
C. Coffee, 'Starting from Scratch: The Legal and Institutional Steps to Viable Securities
Markets in Transitions Economies, Review of Central and East European Law 27 (2001) 7,
for a more detailed discussion of what was missing in the Czech and Russian voucher
privatisations.
115 See e.g. Milhaupt and Pistor (n in), and Kent Greenfield, Failure of Corporate Law:
Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities (The University of Chicago Press, 2oo6).
See also Bernard S. Black, 'Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis,
Northwestern University Law Review 84 (1990) 542 (for the re-examination of several tenets
of corporate theory in the light of Russia's privatisation failures).
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consequences of the post-communist privatisations.n6 Because of these con-
sequences, large swaths of populations in CEE and the former USSR have been
assessing for some time the privatisation laws as an outright 'theft.'
The examples outlined above were not the only instances when ignorance
of the particularities of communist property led to unintended conse-
quences of privatisation laws. The enormous differences between the social
arrangements of property in the real existing socialism and in capitalism, and
the conceptual lines in which they diverge, are nicely captured for example
by Catherine Alexander in her analysis of privatisation in Kazakhstan.1 7 As
Alexander notes:
In particular, the process of privatisation... problematises the very defi-
nitions of 'person,' 'thing,' and 'relation,' bringing to the fore the polyva-
lent nature of value implicit in any property relation. 18
In addition to 'person', 'thing', 'relation' and 'values', which constitute the con-
ceptual building blocks of property relations described by Alexander, in the
dynamic of post-socialist transformations appears another element, namely
the state. Again in the words of Alexander:
The state too appears as a crucial element in the way people talk about the
reconfiguring of persons, things, and relations. A sense of abandonment
by an overarching structure that had meshed persons and objects
together appeared repeatedly in informants' accounts under the rubric
'theft.' In the conclusion, I return to the notion of theft as relational
absence, the dark mirror of property relations."9
In sum, as a result of the post-communist privatisation policies' ignorance
of the particularities of the socialist organisation of property, the post-
communist societies learned two facts the hard way. First, that the socialist
estates reflected a socio-legal reality and a mode of social governance differ-
ent from those reflected by the Western and pre-socialist civil law concepts
116 See e.g. Wladimir Andreff,'Transition through Different Corporate Governance Structures'
(n io) 156.
117 Catherine Alexander, 'Value, Relations, and Changing Bodies: Privatisation and Prop-
erty Rights in Kazakhstan, in Verdery and Humphrey (eds), Property in Question
(n 31) 251.
118 Ibid. 252
119 Ibid.
GLOBAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3 (2014) 137-185
167
DAMSA
such as 'juridical person' and 'patrimony.'120 A simple change of formal law
that left intact the social governance and the networks of administrators
who ran the socialist estates would have plenty of unintended and per-
verse consequences. And second, that the enactment of formal law alone,
followed by the move of assets from state to private corporate actors, would
not do the trick of transforming overnight a complex system named generi-
cally a 'socialist' economy into another complex system called a 'market'
economy.
The ineptitude of the neoliberal project of privatisation in post-communist
CEE is even clearer if, in addition to the above considerations related to the
formal law of property, the political economy of property in communist CEE is
taken in consideration. In this respect, it should be noted that the former
Soviet CEE satellites tolerated significant pockets of such private property.121
As was shown above, Poland reversed the collectivisation course in the 196os
and had the rural sector dominated by private property. For its part, Hungary,
during the 1970s and '8os, took important steps in experimenting with pri-
vate property, and in 1989 had an important share of its GDP produced by the
12o The civil law concept of patrimony, albeit kept in the communist (and post-communist)
legal vocabulary, covers eventually only the mass of property objects of which a physical
or juridical person could dispose. It covers only imperfectly the 'administration rights'
enjoyed by the socialist enterprise, especially since the state property administered by
socialist enterprises was in principle inalienable and could not be disposed of by con-
tract, as it could be the private property forming the patrimony of a private enterprise.
In addition, while the civil law physical/juridical person distinctions were kept in the
communist legal vocabulary, there was not equal standing among these persons, vis a vis
property or social ordering. As has been shown, from a property's perspective there is a
radical departure in communist law from the civil law concept of equality of persons,
the communists organising complex hierarchies of persons with respect to property
holdings. Moreover, the communist generic'right of direct administration; while accom-
plishing somehow in the ordering of communist property functions similar to those
accomplished in the civil law of property by the dismemberments of property, usus,
fructus and abusus (the rights to use, to collect the fruits of the thing, and to dispose of the
thing, which form the substance of ownership), it was nevertheless something conceptu-
ally different from the civil law dismemberments of property. Overall the communist
generic 'right of administration' fell short of the qualities of ownership in civil law.
121 I used the term 'Soviet satellites' to suggest the legal operational overhaul of the civil
codes in force in these countries, by a series of various decrees of Soviet inspiration,
which were introduced almost simultaneously during the communist coups in the late
1940s, in all the countries concerned. Although legal differences persisted in all the
CEE communist countries, 'Soviet law' is a useful conceptual shorthand for referring to
communist law in these countries.
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private sector.122 By contrast, the most '6tatised' socialist countries' economies,
for example Czechoslovakia's, had less than io per cent of the GDP share pro-
duced by the private sector at the time.
Furthermore, important stocks of private residential property considered
'personal property' existed all over CEE communist space. For example, in
Bulgaria 84 per cent of the housing stock was in private hands in the late 198os,
in Romania close to 75 per cent of this stock was in private hands, and in
Hungary and Slovenia close to 70 per cent of the housing stock was privately
owned, while in Czechoslovakia and Poland only 40 per cent of the dwelling
units were privately owned. 23
Moreover, even in respect to the ideologically untouchable communist
'means of production, there were experiments with a more liberalised regime
of industrial and agricultural property in communist Europe.124 Hungary, for
example, pioneered in the late 1980s legislation which would allow for the
transfer of state property, and implemented at the end of 1988 and in early 1989
Acts allowing for the formation of business entities independent of state
control. Thus Act VI of 1988 on Economic Associations was enacted by the
Hungarian parliament (then dominated by the communist party) in October
1988, modifying the corporate law chapter of the 1875 Merchant Code, as well
as the 1930 Act on Limited liability companies, the laws governing state enter-
prises, cooperatives, and enterprises which included foreign persons. In
November 1988 the Hungarian parliament passed Act xxiV of 1988 on Foreign
Investment, and at the end of May 1989, the same parliament passed Act xiII
of 1989 on the Transformation of Business Organizations and Associations.
The later act would eventually allow for "nomenklatura privatisations," offer-
ing a preview of the scandals which would rock the former communist CEE
countries, when they would pursue similar legislative paths. Hungary's Act
would eventually become an embarrassment to the Hungarian Parliament, as
122 Respectively 30 per cent of the GDP for Poland (EBRD report, 1999, 252) and approxi-
mately 25 per cent in1990 for Hungary (EBRD report, 1999, 228) following two decades of
experimentation with the so-called New Economic Mechanism (NEP).
123 See e.g. Kiril Stanilov, 'Housing trends in Central and Eastern European Cities' (n 6)
177. See also Hegedis, Tosics and Mayo, 'Transition of the Housing Sector' (n 6) 103; and
for Poland and Czechoslovakia, R. Struyk, 'Housing Privatisation in the Former Soviet
Bloc to 1995, in Andruzs, Harloe and Szelenyi (eds), Cities after Socialism (n 6) 192.
124 In Hungary under the 'Goulash communism' of Kadar and in Poland in the late years of
military regime nomenldatura privatisations flourished. These countries are 'showcases'
of the unintended consequences of such experiments with privatisation. Polish and
Hungarian departures from the Soviet model of agriculture also explain why 'restitution'
of agricultural land was important in some places but not in all.
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it was obvious that this legislation could not safeguard again the undervalued
sale of equity in Hungarian state-owned enterprises.125 These lessons were not
learned by post-communist governments which enacted similar legislation, of
neoliberal inspiration, a few years after. Nevertheless, the point is that, besides
the legal transformations which it initiated during the late 198os, Hungary was
a frontrunner of liberalised regimes of industrial and agricultural property
from the early 1970s, and it was followed by Poland and the USSR in the 1980s.
Thus, in 1989 considerable variation existed in communist CEE with respect to
the share of private property in the national economy. Czechoslovakia, the for-
mer GDR and Romania were all leaning towards the end of a spectrum where
socialist property completely dominated the economy, while Hungary and
Poland were at the opposite end of the spectrum. Nevertheless, and in spite of
this variation, in all the 'socialist' countries private property represented a
social and legal category fully accepted by the communist state. 26 Moreover,
this regulation of private property by the communist state did not diverge
fundamentally, at least in its formal, legal, characteristics, from the Western
notions of property.
Therefore, if one wants to see what made the transformation of socialist
property into private property such a protracted and intractable issue during
(at least) the first decade of post-communist property transformations, one
has to look beyond the mere law in the books and the formal definitional
aspects of property, to the ways in which law operated. Ultimately, one has to
look to the assumptions on which the post-communist economic transforma-
tions were based. In this respect, I cannot attempt to provide in this article a
full and authoritative account of what went wrong in the transformations,
given their magnitude and multiple dimensions. What this article can provide
is only a brief overview of some of the scholarly attempts to conceptualise
these transformations, and the outline of an argument which considers the
'justice' dimensions of such transformations. In order to provide the latter, it
125 See e.g. George Gluck,'Foreign Investment in Hungary: An Overview of Recent Legislation',
Whittier Law Review 12 (1991) 166, noting that the 'window of opportunity' for such priva-
tisations was foreclosed as a result of the nomenklatura privatisation scandals in March
1990, by Act VII of 1990 on the State property agency and on the management and devel-
opment of related property, and by Act VIII of 1990 on the protection of state property
entrusted to enterprises. As far as I know, there are no empirical studies documenting
how the agency was capable of monitoring the managers' activity, although a particular-
ity of the Hungarian scheme was that it was designed to attract foreign investment.
126 Even if curtailed more by some of these communist states than by the frontrunners,
Hungary, Poland, the USSR and Yugoslavia.
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should be restated that the communist property, far from being a 'non-
existent' category or a regression from pre-socialist times, was in reality a very
complex category.127 Thus, the organisation of the 'real socialist' property was
an administrative matter more than a legal one. In such a system, administra-
tive discretion was far more important than legal procedures aiming at regular-
ity and certainty. Furthermore, hierarchical relations of property forms
introduced by socialism produced a hierarchy of estates of administration,28
where the entities lower on the hierarchy than the state were granted sorts of
'administrative rights'on the estate assigned by the state to the respective enti-
ties. These administration rights were very different in their nature from
the usus and usufruct of the civil and Western law. Further, in such estates, the
socialist managers had sui 9eneris administrative rights to move items
of socialist property at will, in huge trade networks made by similar socialist
administrators of state enterprises. In theory, nevertheless, the patrimony of
the state, out of which such administrative estates were carved, was consid-
ered inalienable. The fiction of the inalienability of state patrimony, and the
idea that since all the administrative estates belonged to the inalienable patri-
mony of the state it was fine to move items among administrative estates,
made such movement possible. However, the movement of socialist items of
property by socialist managers transformed the socialist landscape (and, in my
view, all the patrimonies of socialist corporate entities) into one with elastic
qualities, as described by Verdery.129 Although Verdery drew this inspiring
characterisation out of an analysis of post-communist transformations in land
ownership, her description could be extended to the whole notion of the pat-
rimony of former socialist estates which were transformed into private enter-
prises after the fall of communism. In theory these patrimonies of the newly
created private enterprises consisted, according to the civil law definitions, in
127 See Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski, Privatisation in Eastern Europe: Is the
State Withering Away? (Budapest: CEU Press, 1994), cited by Verdery in The Vanishing
Hectare (n 32) 41:'[T]he socialist economies of Eastern Europe did not have any property
system ... governing their productive activities.'
128 Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare (n 32).
129 Ibid. The post-socialist'elastic qualities' of land and the post-communist tendency to hide
land described by Verdery present striking similarities to the post-tsarist Russia period,
even if in Russia the peasants, and not the administrators of the land, utilised such tactics.
For a detailed account of the struggles between the early Soviet power and the peasants
after the October Revolution, see generally James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain
Schemes to Impmve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1998), especially Chapter 6, 'The Soviet Collectivization on the Capitalist
Dreams.'
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the totality of debts, credits and physical objects 'owned' by ajuridical person
according to the formal law. In practice, the (former) communist managers
were left to administer such entities as they knew best, and the operational
rules of communist property were left untouched by the post-communist
changes informal law. Thus, every item belonging to the patrimony of these
new corporate entities continued in fact to be removed at sole will by (former)
socialist managers, and vanished or reappeared in this patrimony according to
the socialist administrators' desires. This movement of items at the will of for-
mer socialist administrators made the patrimony of newly created 'private'
enterprises a very elastic one and the formal law regulating the creation of
such entities meaningless.
5 Transforming Communist Property Into Private Property: Some
Normative Problems
Admitting, arguendo, that post-communist privatisation was necessary, if one
really wants to transform communist property into private property, one has to
change, as has been shown, the operational rules according to which commu-
nist property functions. Consequently, the established networks of socialist
managers have to be disrupted somehow, for example by removing such man-
agers from the positions held. Because neither of these two conditions was
fully met in the early phase of post-communist transition, the operating rules
of socialist estates continued to produce effects. In the early post-communist
years for example, the former administrators of the socialist estates were left
untouched by the change of regime in C EE. 130 They could move, almost at will,
items belonging to the former socialist estates, thereby further reducing the
former socialist property subjected to privatisation or restitution. These char-
acteristics of the transitional period posed several problems which would
reflect on the legitimacy of the whole process of post-communist property
transformations. First, they allowed for the creation of the phenomenon that
Stark observed in Hungary and described as'recombinant' socialist property.31
Accordingly to Stark, the 'recombination' of socialist property consisted in
the reorganisation of the debts of the former socialist enterprises under the
umbrella of empty corporate shells. It also consisted in the 'privatisation,
130 With the former GDR as a notable exception as a result of its unification with Western
Germany.
131 See David Stark, 'Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism', The American
Journal ofSociology 101(4) (1996) 993.
GLOBAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3 (2014) 137-185
172
THE INCOMPREHENSIBLE POST-COMMUNIST PRIVATISATION
boarding, or hiding of the assets, organised under myriad corporate shells, all
under the control of the former socialist administrators and their cronies.'32
In the words of Stark:
Recombinant property is a form of organizational hedging in which
actors respond to uncertainty by diversifying assets, redefining and
recombining resources. It is an attempt to hold resources that can be jus-
tified by more than one legitimating principle. Property transformation
in postsocialist Hungary involves the decentralized reorganization of
assets and the centralized management of liabilities. Together they blur
the boundaries of public and private, the boundaries of enterprises,
and the boundedness of justificatory principles. 33
Another scholar of post-socialist transformations, Ganev, analysing the phe-
nomenon of transformation of state property in Bulgaria, described the pro-
cess as 'preying on the state.134 In Poland, the phenomenon was described
by the Polish sociologists as political capitalism,13 5 or the privatisation of
the police state.136 In other words, the persistence of communist proper-
ty's operational rules long after the demise of the socialist system in CEE,
coupled with the insistence to privatise communist property in the blurred
state-private divide characteristic of post-communist societies, 37 allowed
shadow transfers of property from the state entities to various private enti-
ties. These shadow transfers went far beyond what was permissible under the
formal law. Thus, the post-socialist 'law in the books', which left untouched
the operational rules of communist property, did not impede in any way the
(former) socialist administrators to move at will items among the communist
hierarchies of estates, formally transformed into capitalist corporations. And
this post-socialist law in the books could not hinder the (former) socialist
132 Ibid. In the light of later corporate scandals such as Enron, it is however questionable
whether such phenomenon was particular to pathologies of capitalism as developed in
the early stages of transformation of the transitional countries or has more to do with the
way in which law and corporations are conceptualised and work.
133 Stark, Recombinant Property (n 131) 993.
134 See Ganev, Preying on the State (n 59).
135 See Jadwiga Staniszkis, '"Political Capitalism" in Poland, East European Politics and
Societies 5(1) (1991)127.
136 See Maria ol and Andrzej Zybertowicz, Privatizing the Police-State (n 113).
137 Janine R. Wedel, 'Blurring the State-Private Divide: Flex Organisations and the Decline of
Accountability' in: Max Spoor (ed.), Globalisation, Poverty and Conflict (Springer
Netherlands, 2005) 217.
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administrators from moving items at will from such estates to the administra-
tors"pockets.'138 Moreover, the former socialist administrators were generally
left in their former positions after the regime change or were confirmed as
managers of 'post-socialist' entities. Thus, lustration, or the administrative
removal of cadres associated with the communist regimes from public posi-
tions in the new political regimes, became a bitter theme in post-socialist CEE,
while non-existent as a transitional justice issue in other countries traversing
democratisation processes. Lustration was a bitter theme because it targeted,
among other ex-communist cadres, the former administrators of the socialist
hierarchical estates, who were running post-socialist corporate entities.139
Thus, lustration had the potential to dramatically upset the maintenance of
the former socialist estates functioning within empty, Western-type corporate
shells imposed by privatisation laws. And, by targeting the administrators of
the socialist 'estates of production' for removal, lustration would also contrib-
ute to the dismantling of the socialist networks that survived the fall of com-
munism. Nevertheless, as lustration laws were not enacted in the region by the
post-1989 CEE legislatures, 140 this dismantling of the socialist networks did not
happen across the region in the first post-communist years.141 Therefore,
socialist property transformation and lustration, albeit distinct concepts anal-
ysed individually and separately in the transitional justice literature, could also
be seen as interrelated in the context of post-communist transformations.
Seen as interrelated with property transformations, lustration would support,
nevertheless, the socialist estates' transformations into juristic or civil per-
sons which use the former socialist objects of property in conformity to the
civil law rules.
Curiously enough, the issues of nomenklatura privatisations and accumula-
tion of property by the former socialist technocratic elites, theorised quite vig-
orously in the sociological and anthropological literature in the first decade of
138 And led to the so-called nomenklatura'privatisation' taking place in the countries which
'liberalised' the corporate regimes.
139 Transformed into various corporative forms.
140 With the exception of the former GDR and Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak law,
however, did not target for removal former administrators of 'socialist' estates or
enterprises.
141 For an exemplification of the power of the networks, social capital of the former 'socialist
estates' administrators, in the post-communist transformations of Romania, see Verdery,
The Vanishing Hectare (n 32). There are numerous other individual case studies in other
post-communist CEE countries, whose enumeration will be beyond the scope of this
study.
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transformations,14 2 were dealt with less systematically in the legal scholar-
ship. Also lacking in legal scholarship is the theorisation of another dimen-
sion of justice of the post-communist property transformations, namely
the inequalities originating in communist times but amplified by the disman-
tling of the communist era industrial and agricultural conglomerates.14 3 Yet,
a typical communist industrial or agricultural enterprise was not only a build-
ing block of communist development but also the place where the commu-
nist social redistribution was taking place.144 Catherine Alexander aptly
captures in the anthropological literature the dimension of the social infra-
structure developed around the mammoth communist conglomerates, in her
142 The sociological discussion on the nomenklatura privatisation in post-communism is too
wide to be cited here otherwise than selectively and just by way of example. Moreover,
there is no agreement among diverse authors with respect to the social implications of
market transformations, and there is justified criticism for the abandonment by the soci-
ologists of the analysis of social inequalities (generated by communism and perpetuated
or amplified by the new regimes) in favour of rather vague categories such as markets and
social networking. By way of example, see Victor Nee, 'A Theory of Market Transition:
From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism', American SociologicalReview 54 (1989)
663; Victor Nee,'Social Inequalities in Reforming State Socialism: Between Redistribution
and Markets in China', American Sociological Review 56 (1991) 267; Elemer Hankiss, East
European Alternatives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Andrew Walder, 'Property Rights
and Stratification in Socialist Redistributive Economies, American Sociological Review 57
(1992) 524; Chris Hann,'From Production to Property: Decollectivization and the Family-
Land Relationship in Contemporary Hungary', Man 28(3) (1993) 299; Akos R6na-Tas, 'The
First Shall Be Last? Entrepreneurship and Communist Cadres in the Transition from
Socialism', American Journal of Sociology loo(i) (1994) 40; David Stark and Lazlo Bruszt,
Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe
(Cambridge University Press, 1998); Eric Hanley, 'Cadre Capitalism in Hungary and
Poland: Property Accumulation among Communist-era Elites, East European Politics and
Societies 14 (1999) 143; Andrew G. Walder, 'Elite Opportunity in Transitional Economies,
American Sociological Review 68(6) (2003) 899; Michael Burawoy, 'Neoclassical Sociology:
From the End of Communism to the End of Classes, American journal ofSociology 106(4)
(2001) 1099. For reviews of the literature on the market transition debate, see for example
IvAn Sz6l6nyi and Eric Kostello, 'The Market Transition Debate: Toward a Synthesis?',
American Journal of Sociology, 101(4) (1996) 1082, and Yang Cao and Victor G. Nee,
'Comment Controversies and Evidence in the Market Transition Debate, American
Journal ofSociology 105(4) (2000) 1175.
143 But see Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring (n 19), for a theorisation in legal
scholarship of the normative implications of social and gender inequalities brought by
post-communist privatisations.
144 Alexander, 'Value, Relations, and Changing Bodies' (n 117).
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description of the Textile Kombinat of Almaty in Kazahstan. Accordingly to
Alexander:
The supporting social infrastructure was breathtaking. More than 9,ooo
people were housed in factory hostels and apartment blocks built for
workers. There were kindergartens, holiday resorts, hospitals, pioneer
camps, and a colossal Palace of Culture. 145
She further captures what happened with the huge social infrastructure built
around these conglomerates as a result of 'privatisation':
The Kombinat was privatized in the mid-199os. The immediate conse-
quence was the rapid divestment of the social facilities and the gradual
closure of one department after another... No social facilities remained;
the hospitals, apartment blocks, and pioneer camps were either sold or
handed over to the city council. 14 6
The development of such immense industrial conglomerates around the USSR
and the CEE communist states varied widely, depending on the industrial and
agricultural policies pursued by different communist countries at different
moments. Nonetheless, the industrial conglomerates represented an ideal of
development during the communist times across the whole communist region.
These industrial conglomerates reproduced, on a larger scale than the indi-
vidual enterprises, the social redistribution operated by any industrial enter-
prise in socialism. Analytically speaking, they are useful units for analyses of
privatisation and deindustrialisation and for analyses of inequalities gener-
ated by the politics of post-communist privatisations. The social implications
of the privatisation of these conglomerates and of the subsequent disman-
tling of the redistribution they operated are enormous, yet are barely dis-
cussed in the legal literature,14 7 in spite of more extensive discussions in the
anthropological, geographic, economic and political theory literature. Some
political scientists, for example, point to the fact that the post-communist CEE
regimes were quicker than those in the former USSR to adopt at least some
social policies capable of alleviating some costs of the economic transition and
145 Ibid 260
146 Ibid.
147 See e.g. Kent Klaudt, 'Hungary after the Revolution: Privatisation, Economic Ideology and
the False Promise of the Free Market!, Law and Inequality (1995) 303 (for a general discus-
sion on the case of Hungary).
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of buffering the official income, which was plummeting in the early phase of
post-communist transition.148 But these measures were adopted mainly
because of political calculus and for strategic reasons, and not because the
politicians believed that distributive justice principles demanded such mea-
sures.149 A similar argument, this time related to the transformation of com-
munist property into private property via restitution, was made by social
scientists who observed that the post-communist restitution laws were shaped
by all sorts of 'arbitrary interests, privileges and resentments', under the
umbrella of 'lofty principles of justice.'150 Moreover, more recent studies show
148 See e.g. Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss (eds), Institutional Design in Post-
communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge University Press, 1998), for an
argument that the weak elites,which emerged from communism implosion in the region
could not have the necessary legitimacy to impose a clearly dominant plan or project of
transformation or be selective and sequential in the agenda setting, but had to satisfy
multiple constituencies, eventually by social protective measures. See also Anna
Grzymala-Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-
Communist Democracies (Cambridge University Press, 2007) (for a more recent political
theory description of various strategies, including privatisation strategies, adopted by
political post-communist elites) and Pieter Vanhuysse, Divide and Pacify: Strategic Social
Policies andPoliticalProtests in Post-CommunistDemocracies (Central European University
Press, 2006), for a comprehensive discussion of the policies of early retirement and divi-
sion of labour practised by the post-communist governments in CEE, as buffers for eco-
nomic distress (with the notable exception of the Czech Republic, up to a point). For a
more comprehensive discussion of the earlier social stratification data from the region
see Henryk Domanski, On the Verge of Convergence: Social Stratfication in Eastern Europe
(Central European University Press, 2000). For Russia, see e.g. Boris Kagarlitsky, Russia
under Yeltsin and Putin:Neo-liberalAutocracy (London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002)
134 ff. For a discussion on the hidden economies of post-communist countries, see Miria
Lack6, 'Hidden Economy - an Unknown Quantity? Comparative Analysis of Hidden
Economies in Transition Countries, 1989-95, Economics of Transition 8(1) (2000) U7.
149 Vanhuysse, Divide and Pacify (n 148); Alflo Cerami and Pieter Vanhuysse (eds), Post-
Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central and
Eastern Europe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
150 Claus Offe and Frank Bonker,'A Forum on Restitution: Essays on the Efficiency and Justice
of Returning Property to its Former Owners, East European ConstitutionalReview 2 (1993)
30 at 31. The argument is repeated in Frank Bbnker, Ulrich K. Preuss and Claus Offe,
Efficiency and justice of Property Restitution in East Europe (Zentrum fiir Europaische
Rechtspolitik, Universitat Bremen, ZERP-Diskussionspapier, Vol. 5: Papers on East
European Constitution Building, ZERP, 1993), and in Claus Offe and Frank Bonker,
'The Morality of Restitution: Reflections on Some Normative Questions Raised by the
Transition to Private Economy', in Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East European
and East German Experience (Polity Press, 1996) 105.
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the link between privatisation and the levels of perceived corruption 5 and
reveal other negative social consequences of privatisation, including correla-
tions between speedy mass privatisation and increases in rates of mortality.152
Such scholarship totally undermines the neoliberal consequentialist claim
that privatisation improves the overall well-being of the citizens of the coun-
tries adopting such policies. It also undermines the neoliberal claim that
privatisation and maketisation could advance the democratic processes in
post-communist countries.153 From a normative, distributive justice perspec-
tive, this scholarship strengthens the idea that the neoliberal privatisation
policies on the scale advocated in post-communist Europe are normatively
inconsistent and deserve to be reconsidered as such in legal scholarship. Such
reconsideration may be timely, especially since the idea that dismantling the
socialist enterprises and conglomerates by 'privatisation' would imply a drastic
reduction in the social redistribution operated by communism was not dis-
cussed in any depth in the legal literature. Moreover, the policies which oper-
ated this reduction could and should be assessed normatively, and from a
distributive justice perspective, in legal scholarship. Similarly, the idea that the
communist social redistribution should be replaced by 'capitalist' modes of
151 See G. Gulsun Arikan, 'How Privatizations Affect the Level of Perceived Corruption,
Public Finance Review 36 (2008) 706. For a rebuttal of simplistic neoliberal conceptualiza-
tion of post-communist corruption, see also Andrds Saj6, 'From Corruption to Extortion:
Conceptualization of Post-communist Corruption, Crime, Law and Social Change 40(2-3)
(2oo3) 171.
152 See e.g. D. Stuckler, L. King and M. McKee, 'Mass Privatization and the Post-Communist
Mortality Crisis: A Cross-National Analysis, Lancet 373(9661) (2009) 399. See also David
Stuckler, Lawrence King and Martin McKee, 'Response to Michael Gentile "Mass
Privatisation, Unemployment and Mortality", Euope-Asia Studies 64(5) (2012) 949, for a
review of the literature on the subject; Julian Wucherpfennig and Franziska Deutsch,
'Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence Revisited, Living Reviews in
Democracy, 1 (2009) (http://www.livingreviews.org/lrd-2009-4), arguing that that socio-
economic development of the kind impeded by large privatisation policies tends to bring
about stable democracy; Lawrence King and David Stuckler, 'Mass Privatization and the
Post-communist Mortality Crisis, in: Lane (ed.), The Transformation of State Socialism
(n 25) 197.
153 For a contestation of the neoliberal idea of a link between 'democratisation' and major
economic changes in post-communist societies, particularly for the inimical relation
between the two ideas in the political theory literature, see e.g. Ellen Comisso, 'Property
Rights, Liberalism, and the Transition from "Actually Existing" Socialism, East European
Politics and Societies 5(1) (1991) 162 at 162. For a call for reconsideration of such neoliberal
claims in legal scholarship, see e.g. Amy Chua, 'The Paradox of Free Market Democracy:
Rethinking Development Policy', Harvard International LawJournal 41 (2000) 287.
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social reproduction, in order to soften the undesirable normative conse-
quences of privatisation, was not discussed in the legal scholarship. Thus, the
legal scholarship aided by such absences the politicians of the region's unilat-
eral'sale' to the peoples of CEE and the former USSR of one side of the'privati-
sation' process, consisting in the wide distribution of shares in the privatised
enterprises. But the people were not told the darker side of the privatisation
bargain. There was no explanation that privatisation would consist in major
reduction and elimination of the redistribution operated by communism via
the socialist enterprises, without an immediate replacement of the socialist
modes of distribution by new ones. The people were not told that privatisation
might imply a distribution of 'rights' which might prove in the end worthless,
since the securities market on which these rights could be traded did not exist,
and anything of value was already appropriated by the former socialist manag-
ers or by those involved in 'privatisation' processes. If 'rights' associated with
'redistribution' could be conceptualised as a suigeneris'new property"5" (even
if in communism redistribution was not a matter of rights), then the people of
post-communist CEE countries traded in the process of privatisation the new
property rights associated with social redistribution for illusory property rights
associated with shares in the privatised enterprises. This trade and an analysis
of factors which made it possible should be the objective of any future theori-
sation of post-communist CEE privatisation, as they are missing subjects in
legal scholarship.
After more than two decades, and with the economies of former communist
countries totally dominated by the private sector, the process of privatisation
in CEE and its accompanying 'nomenklatura privatisation' could be thought of
as long foreclosed, and therefore more of historical than contemporary inter-
est. For example, the former socialist-managers' drive to accumulate property
accompanied a first phase of privatisation across the whole region. This phase,
corresponding to the first years of post-communist transition, was character-
ised by the priority given to the so-called small-scale privatisation in a process
dominated by the local people. Analytically, this phase is somehow distin-
guishable from a second phase, closer in time to the accession of the countries
in the region to the EU. In this phase, big enterprises were privatised or liqui-
dated, and global players and investors started to invest in the region.155
154 Charles Reich, 'The New Property, Yale Law Journal 73 (1964) 733.
155 For a discussion of these distinct phases' impact on the real estate development of post-
socialist cities, see generally Stanilov, The Post-Socialist City (n 6), and for examples of the
impact of these phases on the industrial development see Berend, From the Soviet Bloc to
the European Union (n 24) 134-
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Moreover, there are major differences in the privatisation strategies followed
by different countries in the region even in the first phase of privatisation,
even if there is a general commonality between the countries in the region
regarding the impossibility of immediately privatising big industrial con-
glomerates or converting them into viable, private enterprises. Hungary,
for example, gave priority to direct sales to foreign investors while Romania,
at the opposite end of the spectrum, preferred privatisation by insiders.
Irrespective of these preferences, both privatisation phases may appear
now to be foreclosed in all countries of the region, and mostly of historical
interest.
However, the study of the transformations of property, arguably, still
presents more than mere academic interest for several reasons. One major rea-
son is that private property presents problems of justification from a moral
standpoint in any individualistic account,156 even if the restrained versions of
such justification could be defensible. Even if we admit, for the sake of the
argument, that a degree of property appropriation in post-communism could
be fully justified from a Lockean perspective or in a Nozickian account, we can
see that an appropriation of property which would break the Lockean pro-
viso (leave enough property to be appropriated for others) or the Nozickian
proviso of justice in transactions would have major problems of justification
even under a classical or modem liberal account. So it is very doubtful that
such accumulations of property by 'grab' and 'plunder' by the former agents of
the communist regimes could be justified in any classical liberal theory. Russia
and the cis countries represent, without doubt, pathologies of privatisation in
relation to the countries of the CEE space, the Yeltsin regime's 'loans and
shares' programme, for example, being unique across the post-communist
space. Nevertheless, it is instructive and, to a point, representative for the
whole ex-communist space to recount, in the context of the discussion about
the grab and plunder, Igor Baranovsky's characterisation of the Russian
nomenklatura privatisations:
To become a millionaire in our country it is not at all necessary to
have a good head and specialized knowledge. Often it is enough to have
active support in the government, the parliament, local power structures
and law enforcement agencies. One fine day your insignificant bank is
authorized, for instance, to conduct operations with budgetary funds. Or
156 See e.g. Becker, 'Review: Too Much Property' (n 13); Carter, The Philosophical Foundations
of Property (n 13).
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quotas are generously allotted for the export of oil, timber, and gas. In
other words, you are appointed a millionaire.157
Arguably such grab and plunder needs no moral justification of any sort and
could be declared to be state policy by the new post-communist governments,
with the renunciation of any pretension ofjustification. Unfortunately, this did
not happen, and in the post-communist property transformations moral justi-
fications played an important role. It was not only that the communist prop-
erty relations were declared morally bankrupt from a moral-utilitarian point of
view, as they allegedly promoted inefficiency and waste, or that the communist
property relations were declared morally vicious, since they were based on the
violent and abusive initial takeover of the late 1940s. It was also proclaimed
that the arrangements of property promoted under the banner of neoliberal-
ism were morally superior to those on which the socialist ones rested. Because
this moral superiority was asserted substantially on the basis of a utilitarian-
consequential framework, it encountered major justificatory problems when
the consequences were, if not dire, in any case not those 'predicted' by the
social engineers of the transformations. As it was later observed by theorists of
the post-communist transitions:
None of the transition countries has successfully accomplished the rapid
privatisation of the state sector. A general survey of post communist pri-
vatisation in the 1990s concludes that at best results have been mixed.158
While the privatisation project was unsuccessful in achieving its declared goals
in the 1990s, it was nevertheless successful in creating a new class of owners,
formed, in no small measure, by the 'morally suspect' category of former com-
munist managers of state-owned enterprises.159 With the passing of time, one
might expect, however, that the problems with the initial acquisitions of prop-
erty would vanish, especially as third parties, such as foreign investors, acquired
the titles of property that was initially tainted.o60 Moreover, if the conse-
157 Igor Baranovsky, cited by Black, Kraakman and Tarassova in 'Russian Privatisation and
Corporate Governance' (n no) 1744.
158 Bonker, Mfiler and Pickel, 'Cross-disciplinary Approaches to Postcommunist
Transformation' (n 5) 17; The European Bank ofReconstruction andDevelopment Transition
Report 1999 32.
159 A. Tucker, A.M. Ruibal, J. Cahill and F. Brown, The New Politics of Property Rights, Critical
Review 16(4) (2004) 377.
160 See Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitionaljustice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge
University Press, 2004) 216, for the theorisation of emotions' decay with the passing of
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quences improve with the passing of time, one could also expect the passions
provoked by initial appropriation of property by former communist agents to
decay. Nonetheless, two decades later, despite some progress,161 it is Still
unclear in what measure the countries of the region have broken with the pre-
vious cycles of underdevelopment and backwardneSS.162 It is also unclear
whether someone could indeed speak of economic convergence with an ide-
alised West.163 Yet, only such a convergence would render the repugnant ways
of acquiring property in post-communism less relevant for the post-commu-
nist regimes' legitimacy.
That the legitimacy problems posed by nomenklatura privatisations to post-
communist societies could not be relegated to the past is shown, for example,
by the recent Euromaidan unrest and the subsequent dramatic international
developments in Ukraine.16 Evidently there are major differences between
Ukraine, or the cis republics, on one hand, and the more successful CEE coun-
tries which are now in the EU, on the other hand.165 In the former countries,
time in the context of transitional justice. But see also Elster for a circumvention of
the cases where emotions do not decay, as for example where there is 'a daily reminder
of the past injustice, ibid 247, and where emotions related to property acquisition by new
elites did not decay even after the passing of a century, because of the so-called biens
nationaux expropriated in France during the Revolutions and given away to the new revo-
lutionary elites, ibid 30-44. See also ThomasJ.F. Riha, 'The Origins of Private Property and
Wealth in Post-Communist Society, International Journal of Social Economics 23(4-6)
(1996), 245 at 245, stating that the way properties have been acquired and the injustice of
the process would impact on economic developments and on the moral health and socio-
political stability of the post-communist societies for generations to come.
161 Berend, From the Soviet Bloc to the European Union (n 24) 135.
162 The backwardness and underdevelopment thesis. See for example Daniel Chirot (ed.),
Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe (University of California Press, 1989), and
Berend, From the Soviet Bloc to the European Union (n 24).
163 See e.g. Berend, From the Soviet Bloc to the European Union (n 24), arguing that the coun-
tries of the region, despite some progress, failed to develop an intensive R&I business
model which would allow them to catch up with the Western model of intensive
development.
164 See e.g. Anastasiya Ryabchuk, 'Right Revolution? Hopes and Perils of the Euromaidan
Protests in Ukraine, Debatte:Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 22(1)
(2014), retrieved July 2014, http://dx.doi.org/o.lo8o/o 9 65 15 6X201 3.8 77 268, linking the
Ukrainian Euromaidan to the 2013 Bulgarian protesters' portrayal of the political and eco-
nomic elites as 'communists, as most of them 'belonged to the old Communist party
nomenklatura that took advantage of the transition for their own private gain, ibid 3.
165 But see e.g. Jacques Rupnik, 'From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash',Journal of
Democracy 18(4) (2007) 17; B61a Greskovits, 'Economic Woes and Political Disaffection',
GLOBAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3 (2014) 137-185
DAMSA
THE INCOMPREHENSIBLE POST-COMMUNIST PRIVATISATION
even the neoliberal orthodoxy acknowledges now that the post-communist
transition did not produce any meaningful convergence with a Western demo-
cratic model, in spite of waves of 'privatisation.' However, it would be mistaken
to believe that the more successful CEE countries would be able to avoid com-
pletely the problems of legitimacy posed by the post-communist privatisa-
tions, so evident in Ukraine. After all, the ideology inspiring privatisation in
both CEE and the former USSR was similar, and the CEE transformation is far
from over, as convincingly suggested in the scholarship.166
6 Conclusions
As has been shown in this paper, the neoliberal orthodoxy that inspired the
large post-communist privatisation programmes was based on weak theoreti-
cal and philosophical bases. The broad normative statements in favour of pri-
vatisation made by scholars who supported this orthodoxy were invalidated by
subsequent social and economic developments in the post-communist world.
However, this was not the only weakness of the early neoliberal project which
pressed for privatisation and marketisation in post-communist Europe. For
reasons discussed above, and in an otherwise extensive literature, law became
increasingly important as a vehicle for modemisation and development in
the early 1990s. In this context, it is not surprising that law was marshalled in
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support of privatisation schemes adopted in post-communist countries.
However, this marshalling of law in support of privatisation in the early post-
communist transformational phase led to an ideological overstatement of pri-
vatisation and restitution as rights constitutive processes. Moreover, the
neoliberal-inspired characterisation of privatisation as a rights constitutive
process spread beyond the ideological overstatement of this legal instrument
as 'rights constitutive'. In this respect, several key findings also emerge from
this study.
First, the particularities of the communist legal arrangements concerning
property were so great in relation to those assumed by the neoliberal designers
of large privatisation programmes in the former communist space that, on
closer scrutiny, all these privatisation policies appear to be flawed. For exam-
ple, the neoliberal privatisation dogma falsely assumed that communist soci-
eties were characterised by an absence of private property. Hence, the state
owned the means of production. The bulk of this state property was to be
found in the possession of the socialist enterprise, or similar collective associa-
tive forms allowed by the communist states. Furthermore, this dogma falsely
assumed that, since the socialist enterprise held the communist property, the
socialist corporate law regulating the socialist enterprise should by definition
be different from Western corporate law. On the basis of these false assump-
tions, the neoliberal orthodoxy recommended simple policy prescriptions. For
example, neoliberal scholars recommended that property held by the commu-
nist state should be transferred to private owners via privatisation. As the
socialist enterprise and similar collective associative forms 'owned' commu-
nist property, these corporate forms were to be transformed into Western-like
corporations. This transformation was regarded as a purely technical matter.
Thus, if the post-communist draftsmen lacked adequate legal imagination,
Western corporate models were readily available for transplantation into post-
communist legal systems. Later, these newly established corporations had to
be 'privatised, in another purely technical move. However, and as shown in
this article, these assumptions were fatally flawed. Contrary to the neoliberal
claims, private property existed under communism, and the accumulation of
private property was even encouraged by different communist regimes in
diverse periods. In addition, 'socialist' corporate law regulating the socialist
enterprise was not fundamentally different from Western corporate law, as had
been assumed by the neoliberal orthodoxy. Moreover, socialist law operated
with the same juristic concepts as Western law in corporate matters. And, con-
trary to the neoliberal claims, what made the socialist enterprise so distinctive
in comparison with the Western corporation was not the formal law but the
operational rules on the basis of which the socialist enterprise functioned.
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These operational rules, largely created by communist administrative fiat
rather than enacted as formal law, allowed communist managers to move
'communist' property freely between various socialist corporate entities, or to
directly appropriate such property. Since these rules did not operate at the
level of formal law but at deeper societal levels, the whole neoliberal project
for post-communist privatisation appears to ignore in totality the socio-legal
reality is wants to transform. Thus, on the one hand, the neoliberal project has
claimed that for successful post-communist privatisation it is necessary to
adopt formal Western corporate law, even though socialist law already oper-
ated with Western juristic concepts in corporate law matters. On the other
hand, the neoliberal project has considered it sufficient to enact formal priva-
tisation laws, even though the distinctiveness of 'communist' ownership
resided in operational rules that were not created in the form of formal laws.
Moreover, neoliberal thinking, generally, accepted that the former communist
managers could be left in place to run the enterprises that were to be priva-
tised, even if the managers had manipulated the operational rules of socialist
ownership. Crucially, neoliberal commentators advocated that the role of the
state should be reduced, even if a strong state apparatus was needed to control
the misappropriation of state property by the former communist manag-
ers. The policy prescriptions of the neoliberal privatisation project therefore
became incoherent. They focused on the enactment of formal laws that were
unnecessary, while failing to address the deeper operational rules that needed
to be altered if privatisation was to accomplish its stated goals.
Second, because the initial neoliberal privatisation project was based on
false assumptions and on mischaracterisations of the socialist legal regime of
ownership and corporate law, it failed to achieve its declared goals, at least
with reasonable promptness. While the privatisation project was unsuccessful
in achieving its declared goals in the 1990s, it was, nevertheless, successful in
creating a new class of owners. This class was formed, in no small measure, by
the former communist managers of state-owned enterprises, who ended up in
many cases as the owners of the privatised companies. But the formation of
this 'class' further illegitimatises the post-communist regime that contributed
to its creation. It also renders illegitimate the transformation of socialist prop-
erty into private property via privatisation, and it cast doubts over the success
of any further proposals to continue to 'reform' sectors of the economies of
these countries by privatisation or marketisation.
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